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Abstract
Using a panel of Spanish fi rms over the period 2002-2012, we investigate the interactions 
between high growth episodes in terms of size and productivity. We fi nd that high growth 
in productivity (size) increases the likelihood of high growth in size (productivity). However, 
the effect from size to productivity is smaller than the effect from productivity to size. We 
also explore the potential role of fi rm-level fi nancial constraints using information from the 
Central Credit Register (CIR) of Banco de España. Our results indicate that credit constraints 
hamper high growth episodes in terms of both size and productivity.
Keywords: high-growth fi rms, high-impact fi rms, productivity, panel fi rm-level data. 
JEL classifi cation: L25, L11, D24, C23.
Resumen
En este artículo se investigan las posibles interacciones entre episodios de alto crecimiento 
de las empresas en tamaño y en productividad, utilizando un panel de empresas españolas 
que comprende el período 2002-2012. Encontramos que alto crecimiento en productividad 
(tamaño) incrementa las posibilidades de tener alto crecimiento en tamaño (productividad). 
Sin embargo, el efecto de tamaño a productividad es menor que de productividad a tamaño. 
Además, exploramos el posible papel desempeñado por las restricciones fi nancieras a nivel 
de empresa, utilizando información procedente de la Central de Información de Riesgos 
(CIR) del Banco de España. Nuestros resultados sugieren que las restricciones fi nancieras 
difi cultan los episodios de alto crecimiento tanto de empleo como de productividad.
Palabras clave: empresas de alto crecimiento, empresas de alto impacto, productividad, 
datos de panel a nivel empresa.
Códigos JEL: L25, L11, D24, C23.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of David Birch (1979, 1981, 1987), there is consensus in the literature
that a few rapidly growing firms (also termed gazelles) are responsible for most of the em-
ployment growth in the economy. Also, it is believed that these firms might be relevant for
structural change in the economy (Acs et al., 2008; Henrekson and Johansson, 2010). As a
result, policymakers have focused their efforts on targeting and supporting high growth firms
(HGF). This is particularly the case in Europe, where HGFs have become a central figure of
the public policy agendas given the weak firm and employment dynamics in comparison with
other advanced economies (Bartelsman et al., 2005). For instance, the Europe 2020 strategy
explicitly mentions the support of high growth small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as
a public policy target (Commission, 2010) while OECD (2010) call for governmental initiatives
to foster the creation of more high-growth firms.
However, while much is known about the importance of fast-growing firms for job creation,
not much is known about their contribution to aggregate productivity, partly due to the lack
of widely available firm-level data. On the other hand, while theoretical predictions around
the relationship between firm growth and productivity are contradictory, with arguments
in favor of firm growth affecting productivity (Penrose, 1959; McCombie, 1987) as well as
productivity triggering firm growth (“growth of the fitter”)(Alchian, 1950; Metcalfe, 1994),
empirical studies analyzing the relationship between high growth episodes in productivity and
high growth episodes in size are scarce (see Section 2). In this paper, we aim to fill this gap.
In studying the determinants of firm’s size and productivity (high) growth1, there is wide
consensus that access to external finance, as well as the firm’s financial condition, should not
be absent from the analysis, specially because they can be endogenous to size and productivity
growth. The availability of firm-level data on outstanding credit and loan applications in the
domestic banking sector from the Central Credit Register (CIR) of Banco de Espan˜a allows
us to investigate the role of access to credit as a determinant of firm’s size and productivity
(high) growth. We believe the Spanish economy provides an ideal setting to analyze this issue,
given that Spanish firms rely on bank credit more than their counterparts in most advanced
economies. According to the “Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises(SAFE), jointly
conducted by the ECB and the European Commission between September and October 2015,
30% of surveyed firms in Spain declared some sort of financial constraint, that is, either
the firm’s application for a bank loan was denied (9%), or the firm received less than the
requested amount (20%), or the firm refused the loan offer because the rate was too high
1Despite their aggregate importance, focusing on HGF when analyzing growth determinants is only justified
if the effects of covariates are non-linear. This is indeed our case: Our results change dramatically when high
growth is replaced by continuous growth. This is particularly true in the case of employment, where almost
all covariates turn non-significant.
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(1%). Furthermore, 6% did not apply for a bank loan because they feared a rejection. These
figures are specially significant, given that 65% of Spanish surveyed firms chose bank loans as
their most preferred type of external financing when it comes to back firm’s growth.2
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it extends the still scarce empirical liter-
ature on the firm growth–productivity nexus, with a focus on the so-called high growth firms
(HGF). For that purpose, we define two types of fast-growing firms: HGFs in employment (ten
percent of firms exhibiting the highest employment growth indicator3 within the same 2-digit
industry in a given year), and HGFs in (labor) productivity (ten percent of firms with the
highest annual growth rate in labor productivity within the same 2-digit industry). We then
estimate the dynamic interdependencies underlying the relationship between productivity and
employment high growth episodes. Second, this paper sheds light on whether financial con-
straints constitute a relevant factor inhibiting firm growth and productivity increases among
Spanish firms. To do so, we create a variable proxying for the extent to which a firm’s access to
external finance is constrained, on the basis of information on its loan applications and current
credit exposures. This information is taken from the Central Credit Register maintained by
the Banco de Espan˜a.
Turning to identification, we aim to give a causal interpretation to our estimates by de-
parting from the strict exogeneity assumption present in OLS and Within Groups estimates,
whereby feedback from the dependent variable to the right-hand-side variables is not allowed
(see Section 5 for more details). For that purpose, we consider panel GMM estimators ad-
vanced by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991), which allow for feedback
effects from current high growth status to subsequent high growth episodes and financial
constraints.
According to our results, high growth episodes in productivity significantly increases the
likelihood of subsequent high growth episodes in terms of size. Depending on the specification,
a firm experiencing a high growth episode in productivity has a probability between 1.5 and
2.2 percentage points higher of experiencing a subsequent high growth episode in size. Given
our definition of high growth firms (see Section 4.2.1), the absolute probability of high growth
is 10% so the magnitude of our estimated effects is sizable. In contrast, the estimated effects
from high growth in size to high growth in productivity range from -0.3 to 1.0 percentage
points depending on the specification. We thus conclude that feedback from productivity
growth to size growth is more important than the effect from size to productivity growth.
2Concretely, surveyed firms were asked (question 20): “If you need external financing to realise your growth
ambitions, what type of external financing would you prefer most?” The available answers were: a) bank loan,
b) loan from other sources, c) equity investment, d) other.
3In particular, we use the Birch-Schreyer index, which is a composite measure of relative and absolute
growth. See section 4.2.1 for further details.
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episodes in terms of both size and productivity. Firms with all loan applications rejected in a
given year are expected to have a lower probability of high growth episodes in subsequent years.
For instance, these firms present a 2.3-2.7 percentage points lower probability of experiencing
a high growth size episode than firms with at least one loan application approved by a new
bank. This figure ranges from 1.3 to 1.9 percentage points depending on the specification in
the case of high growth in productivity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related litera-
ture. Section 3 develops a simple theoretical framework aimed at providing some key insights
about our specification assumptions and empirical results. Section 4 goes over the details and
characteristics of the two main databases used to build our final dataset. A description of the
cleaning process of the data and the main features of the sample, including its representative-
ness, is contained in subsection 4.1. On the other hand, the set of explanatory variables are
covered in subsection 4.2, with a focus on how high growth firms are defined in this paper, as
well as how do we proxy for financial constraints using data on firm’s credit exposure and loan
requests. Section 4.3 describes the contribution of HGFs to aggregate productivity growth and
job creation in Spain. The empirical specification and the econometric approach are explained
in detail in section 5. Finally, section 6 contains estimation results and their discussion, and
section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Research on the economic importance of fast-growing firms as job creators has been vastly
studied since Birch’s seminal work (see Henrekson and Johansson (2010) and Moreno and
Coad (2015) for a review of this literature). Although extant studies differ in the way high
growth firms are defined (see section 4.2.1), and thus comparability of results is limited, they
all coincide in pointing out the disproportionately large share of new net jobs attributable to
a few rapidly growing firms.
In contrast to this clear-cut result regarding employment creation, the incidence of these
HGFs in boosting aggregate productivity is not that clear. The few empirical studies ex-
plicitly addressing the role of productivity among HGFs yield contradicting results (see the
review by Bartelsman and Doms (2000) and a discussion of the topic in Coad (2007)). On
the one hand, in a research commissioned by the US Small Business Administration, Acs
et al. (2008) compared the productivity level (measured as revenue per employee) between
high– and low–impact firms4. On average, high–impact firms exhibit productivity levels 33%
higher than their low–impact counterparts, and this gap seems to be increasing over time. A
4Acs et al. (2008, p.1) define a high-impact firm as “an enterprise with sales that doubled over the most
recent four-year period and a [Birch-Schreyer Index] of two or more over the same period”.
On the other hand, our results also indicate that credit constraints hamper high growth
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similar study conducted by the UK Department for Business Enterprise & Regulatory Reform
(BERR, 2008) also finds that HGFs (Eurostat-OECD definition5) show above-average labor
productivity levels (see also Mason et al. (2014)). On the other hand, Bottazzi et al. (2002)
and Foster et al. (2001) fail to find a robust correlation between labor productivity and firms’
growth. In this line, Baily et al. (1996) observe that downsizing firms contribute to aggregate
labor productivity growth as much as firms increasing employment, and that the remaining
unexplained growth is attributable to entry and exit processes.
From the discussion above, it follows that the joint dynamics of productivity and firm
growth are not well understood. Some authors highlight the potential feedback effects that
high growth in one economic dimension (such as sales or employment) may have on produc-
tivity, and vice versa. Using firm-level data from Sweden, Daunfeldt et al. (2014) define HGFs
as the one percent of firms with the highest growth (over a 7-year period) in terms of labor
productivity (value added per employee), employment, sales and value added. Their analysis
shows very low (contemporaneous) correlations between HGFs defined in terms of labor pro-
ductivity and their employment counterparts. Furthermore, HGFs in productivity contribute
negatively to aggregate employment growth, whilst employment HGFs exhibit a small nega-
tive contribution to aggregate productivity growth, suggesting the existence of a short-term
trade-off between both economic dimensions.
Unlike Daunfeldt et al. (2014), Du and Temouri (2015) focus on non-contemporary links
between HGF status and productivity growth to conclude that the HGF experience is a “self-
reinforcing process”. In particular, Du and Temouri (2015) apply, to a sample of UK firms,
a modified version of the Eurostat-OECD definition of HGF, using firm sales, rather than
employment, as growth indicator. Controlling for firm characteristics (e.g., age, size, average
wage, exporter status, etc.), their analysis yield two interesting results: first, being a HGF
leads to subsequent higher TFP growth rates, and second, firms with higher TFP growth are
more likely to experience fast growth in sales. Finally, Coad and Broekel (2012) focus on the
dynamics underlying the firm growth – productivity nexus by means of reduced-form VARs.
Their findings suggest that employment growth is associated with a subsequent decrease in
total factor productivity (TFP), whereas increases in TFP growth are not followed by much
employment growth.
In a recent paper, Moral-Benito (2016) considers high growth episodes in terms of em-
ployment and total factor productivity as treatment variables, and TFP growth and employ-
ment growth as outcome variables. To be more concrete, the baseline specification considers
high-growth episodes as those firm-year pairs in which the growth rate is above 10%. Using
5The Eurostat-OECD definition identifies high growth firms as “All enterprises with average annualized
growth in employees or turnover greater than 20% per annum, over a three year period, and with more than
10 employees in the beginning of the observation period” (Eurostat-OECD, 2007)
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matching methods, he finds that high-productivity growth is followed by statistically signifi-
cant increases in employment, while high-employment growth is not followed by subsequent
gains in productivity.
Our paper also relates to studies on the role of financing constraints as obstacles for firm
growth. Both theoretical and empirical evidence show that financial constraints negatively
affect firm size and growth dynamics (Bottazzi et al., 2014; Cooley and Quadrini, 2001; Fagiolo
and Luzzi, 2006), and that this effect is more pervasive for younger and smaller firms (Angelini
and Generale, 2008; Cabral and Mata, 2003; Beck et al., 2006). This trend is grounded on two
stylized facts in the corporate finance literature: first, the degree of informational opacity of
small and young firms exacerbates the informational wedge between these firms and suppliers
of finance, making them more prompt to be financially constrained (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981;
Berger and Udell, 1998); second, small firms face greater financial, legal, and corruption
obstacles compared to large firms, and the constraining impact of these obstacles on firm
growth is inversely related with firm size (Beck et al., 2005).
Additionally, our paper adds to the still scarce literature on the effect of financial con-
straints on employment. While there is wide consensus that financial constraints can have
a significant impact on firms’ decisions, such as those affecting investment (Fazzari et al.,
1988; Bond et al., 2003; Campello et al., 2010), working capital (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993),
R&D spending (Hall, 2002; Brown et al., 2009), and on-the-job training (Popov, 2014), little
is known about their effect on firms’ demand for labor. The reason for this is twofold: on
the theoretical side, it is difficult to justify why labor demand would fall after a credit shock
since, in principle, firms could minimize the impact of the shock on employment by reducing
wages, or replacing capital with labor. On the empirical side, endogeneity concerns and data
limitations have made it difficult to trace the effect of credit supply shocks to firm–level real
decisions and outcomes.
Most of the empirical studies analyzing the effect of credit supply shocks on employment
have exploited differences in lender health at the onset of the financial crisis of 2007–2009, as
an exogenous source of variation in firms’ availability of credit. Duygan-Bump et al. (2015)
show that during the Great Recession small firms in sectors identified as highly dependent on
external finance, in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998) work, were significantly more likely
to lay off workers than large firms in the same industries. By contrast, there were no significant
differences in the unemployment rates of small and large firms in sectors with low external
financial dependence. Greenstone et al. (2014) construct an indirect measure of credit supply
shocks at the county-level, using the product of the change in banks’ nationwide lending to
small business and their market share at the county level. Matching this with microdata
from the U.S. Census Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), they show that decreases in
their proxy of credit supply are associated with reductions in county-level lending to small
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establishments and their employment levels over 2008-2009. However, this effect is rather
small: a one standard deviation drop in the 2009 predicted credit supply shock accounts
for 0.6 p.p. decrease in small business employment in the following year. Chodorow-Reich
(2014) assembles a new dataset that matches loan-level data from the Dealscan syndicated
loan database with the employment records from the confidential version of the U.S. Census
LBD. This enables him to construct a firm-specific measure of financial constraints equal to the
weighted average of the post-crisis reduction in the quantity of loans made by the firm’s last
pre-crisis syndicate to other borrowers6. Similar to Greenstone et al. (2014), he finds that firms
engaged with weaker banks before the crisis faced higher financing restrictions than borrowers
of healthier banks, and this translated into comparatively bigger employment losses (of about
4 - 5 pp) among the former relative to the latter. Moreover, he attributes between one-third
and one-half of job losses at small and medium firms over this period to the shortage of credit.
Benmelech et al. (2011) reach similar conclusions exploiting two different quasi-experiments:
first, the state unemployment rate dropped by 0.7 p.p. following the introduction of state-
level bank deregulation laws, that removed restrictions on both intrastate and interstate bank
branching; conversely, unemployment increased by about 1 p.p. in local areas where U.S.
affiliates of Japanese banks reduced lending, following the real estate price decline in Japan
during the 1990s (and the subsequent erosion of Japanese bank balance sheets).
More recently, Bentolila et al. (2016) and Popov and Rocholl (2016) assess the impact
of the credit crunch in Spain and Germany, respectively, on firm-level labor decisions, using
again lender health variation at the onset of the crisis as an exogenous credit shock. Bentolila
et al. (2016) provide evidence that firms with a relatively large pre-crisis exposure to weak
banks experienced larger job cuts (of a magnitude of between 3.2 and 6.2 pp depending on
the estimation method) than at non-exposed firms. This would explain around one-fourth of
aggregate job losses at exposed firms. Moreover, they conclude that firm’s credit history and
the number and intensity of its bank relationships are key factors influencing the estimated
real effects of credit constraints. In line with Bentolila et al. (2016), Popov and Rocholl (2016)
also finds significant declines in employment and wages after the start of the financial crisis
among firms that had a credit relationship with at least one affected bank (i.e., public German
banks with large exposures to the U.S. subprime mortgage market). Interestingly, the decline
in employment induced by the credit supply shock imposed by affected banks on its clients is
increasing with firm size, whereas the decline in average labor compensation decreases with
firm size. This suggest that smaller firms face higher firing costs, and thus are more likely to
adjust to the shortage of credit by cutting on wages rather than with job cuts.
6His methodology relies on two assumptions: first, switching from banks that restricted lending to more
healthy banks has a cost (i.e., borrower-lender relationships are sticky), and second, banks’ health during
the crisis is uncorrelated with pre-crisis borrowers’ characteristics. The latter makes it possible to use the
dispersion in lender health during the 2008-09 crisis as a source of exogenous variation in the availability of
credit to borrowers.
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3 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we develop a simple theoretical model in order to guide and discipline our
empirical exercises as well as to rationalize our main findings.
There is ample literature rationalizing the mechanisms through which financial constraints
may affect firm growth (Duygan-Bump et al., 2015; Bottazzi et al., 2014; Campello et al., 2010).
However, little is known about the theoretical underpinnings of the relation between financial
constraints and productivity. This is the main objective of the model. Moreover, the model
also serves to illustrate a particular mechanism that rationalizes the dynamic interactions
between high growth in employment and productivity. Finally, the model is also useful to
better characterize gazelles as high performance firms, by identifying and excluding some
specific cases that could end in high growth without good performance.
3.1 Basic setup
The model is populated by a large set of firms which take output and input prices as given
and live forever. They all face a standard CES production function (Eq. 1), but can differ
in the specific values of the parameters α, ρ and ν (see Table 1 for a description of these
parameters). Each period, firms receive a known and exogenous productivity shock Ait.
7 All
the realizations of the productivity shock come from a common and stable distribution, and
are independent both between firms and across time.
f(K,L) = Ait (αK
ρ
it + (1− α)Lρit)
ν
ρ , with
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
ν ∈ (0, 1)
α ∈ (0, 1)
ρ ∈ (−∞, 1)
(1)
For simplicity, we assume that the problem is solved statically.8 Also, we model financial
constraints as a limit to capital growth, which cannot exceed a certain growth rate each period.
Finally, we assume capital investments are not refundable, so there is a lower bound to the
7The model hence incorporates some sort of total factor productivity (TFP) shock. However, we focus on
labor productivity both here and in the empirical work. The reason is twofold: (i) TFP is exogenous in the
model so that it cannot be affected by e.g. financial constraints in theory; (ii) TFP is difficult to measure
empirically. We therefore use labor productivity in the empirical section so that we also focus here on the
theoretical predictions for labor productivity.
8The maximization problem itself has little dynamic elements. Basically, the unique intertemporal element
is the effect of Kit on the shadow prices of the constraints in t+ 1. We nonetheless abstract from this effect.
One possible interpretation is that firms’ choices are made by managers, who are mainly worried about the
current profits of the firm.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 14 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1718
amount of capital a firm can have, equal to the previous capital net of depreciation. Under
these assumptions, the maximization problem can be stated as:
Max
Kt,Lt
PitAit (αK
ρ
it + (1− α)Lρit)
ν
ρ − rtKit − wtLit
s.t. δKit−1 ≤ Kit ≤ εKit−1
δ ∈ (0, 1)
ε > 1
(2)
The interior solution to this problem is straightforward, and can be summarized in the
following equations:
K̂it =
(
α
rt
) 1
1−ρ
(νPitAit)
1
1−ν
((
α
rt
) 1
1−ρ
+
(
1− α
wt
) 1
1−ρ
) ν−ρ
ρ(1−ν)
(3)
L̂it =
(
1− α
wt
) 1
1−ρ
(νPitAit)
1
1−ν
((
α
rt
) 1
1−ρ
+
(
1− α
wt
) 1
1−ρ
) ν−ρ
ρ(1−ν)
(4)
ŷit
L̂it
=
1
νPit
((
α
rt
) 1
1−ρ
+
(
1− α
wt
) 1
1−ρ
)(
wt
1− α
) 1
1−ρ
(5)
These last equations show an interesting result: labor depends positively on total factor
productivity (Ait), but labor productivity does not. This is a direct consequence of two of
our assumptions: perfect competition and decreasing returns to scale. Under them, more
productive firms will increase their size until decreasing returns end up compensating for their
higher productivity, because they all face the same prices.
When the interior solution for capital (K̂it) lies between the two constraints, then equations
(3), (4) and (5) are the solution to the problem stated in (2). On the contrary, when the
financial constraint is binding (K̂it > εKit−1), the solution to (2) is to choose K∗t = εKit−1
and obtain Lit from:
Max
Lt
PitAit
(
α(εKit−1)ρ + (1− α)Lρit
) ν
ρ
− rtεKit−1 − wtLit (6)
First order conditions for this problem are:
ν
ρ
PitAit
(
α(εKit−1)ρ + (1− α)Lρit
) ν−ρ
ρ
(1− α)ρLρ−1it = wt (7)
Similarly, if the non-revertible capital constraint is binding, then the solution isKt = δKit−1
and obtain Lit from:
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Max
Lt
PitAit
(
α(δKit−1)ρ + (1− α)Lρit
) ν
ρ
− rtδKit−1 − wtLit (8)
With similar FOC:
ν
ρ
PitAit
(
α(δKit−1)ρ + (1− α)Lρit
) ν−ρ
ρ
(1− α)ρLρ−1it = wt (9)
In both cases, the corner solution cannot be obtained analytically. We present below a
simulation solving the problem numerically9 for a large set of firms.
In any event, one can get some insights about the problem by looking at FOC of the corner
solution under extreme parameter values. In particular, if ρ −→ 1, equation (7) tends to:
νPitAit
(
αεKit−1 + (1− α)Lit
)ν−1
(1− α) = wt (10)
And therefore labor productivity tends to:
y∗it
L∗it
−→
(1− α)Ait
(
νPitAit(1− α)
wt
) ν
1−ν
(
νPitAit(1− α)
wt
) 1
1−ν
− αεKit−1
(11)
This last equation illustrates an important result: labor productivity is increasing in ε (the
financial constraint parameter), which means that, if capital and labor are close to substitutes
(ρ −→ 1), then labor productivity is higher if financial constraints are eased. The intuition
is simple: imagine a firm that receives a large positive shock in Ait; the firm finds optimal
to increase its capital stock but since the financial constraint is binding the firm reacts by
using labor to grow instead; as a result, labor productivity decreases. Had this firm faced
looser financial constraints, then the firm would have used a capital-labor mix more intensive
in capital, and hence its productivity would have been higher.
Turning to the simulation for different parameter values, we populate the model with
200, 000 firms, and simulate them through 35 periods. Each firm gets an independent random
draw of each parameter ρ, α, ε and ν, which is invariant for the whole life of the firm. Also,
they receive a shock Ait in each period. These shocks are independent both across firms and
along time. All the distributions used to pick the random draws are summarized in Table 1.
We also assume that all prices Pit, wit and rit to be constant and equal to 1. Initial capital is
fixed as the interior solution for period t = 1. We nevertheless run the model for another 34
periods just to ensure that all firms had the opportunity to converge to a desired steady state
capital stock. Then we use only the last period to analyze the results of the simulation.
9In particular, we use Newton–Raphson algorithm to solve for L∗it in equations (7) and (9), using the
interior solution (L̂it) as the initial guess.
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Table 1: Parameters Distributions
Parameter Description Distribution
νi Returns to scale parameter Uniform (0.7, 0.9)
αi Capital intensity in production Uniform (0.2, 0.6)
εi Limit on capital growth Uniform (1.05, 1.35)
ρi Elasticity of substitution Normal (1, 1.4815), folded to the left
1.
Ait Efficiency in production Uniform (0.95, 1.05)
δ Capital depreciation 0.95 (constant)
rit Price of one unit of capital Normalized to 1
wit Price of one unit of labor Normalized to 1
Pit Price of selling goods Normalized to 1
1 Domain: (−∞, 1]. The standard deviation chosen for the distribution of ρ is such that half of the
population of firms will have a ρ > 0 (substitutability) and the other half will have a ρ < 0 (comple-
mentarity).
3.2 Implications for gazelles definition
The first result we want to illustrate is plotted in Figure 1. The graph includes a density
function of actual shocks Ai faced by firms, dividing them into four groups, depending on
positive or negative labor productivity and employment growth. Two of these four densities
have a clear mass on positive values, while the opposite is true for the other two. One of the
positive densities (not surprisingly) is the set of firms with positive growth in both variables.
These are firms reacting to a positive shock by increasing employment, but not very fast, so at
the end labor productivity is still increasing. The other set of firms receiving mostly positive
shocks also react by increasing employment, but much faster than the other group, so for this
set labor productivity even falls as a result of the positive TFP shock. On the other side
of the graph, firms facing negative shocks always react by reducing employment. But some
of them reduce it so fast that labor productivity even increases after the bad shock. To get
this result, the assumption of non-reversibility of capital investments is crucial: after a very
bad shock, a firm wants to react by reducing size, but with some optimal capital-labor mix.
For firms hitting the non-reversibility constraint, this is not feasible, so they react by further
reducing labor, hence increasing the capital labor ratio, and with it, labor productivity. We
found this feature also in the data, and that’s the reason we impose an additional non-negative
employment growth constraint to our productivity gazelles definition (see section 4.2.1).
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Figure 1
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3.3 Implications for the role of financial constraints
Another goal of the model is to better understand the role of financial constraints on employ-
ment, and especially, labor productivity growth. For this purpose, we take our simulation and
construct a new, alternative period 35, which is the same as the previous period 35, but now
with an additional easing of the financial constraint parameter ε.10 We then compare this new
period 35 with the previous period 35. The difference can be interpreted as the differential
behavior of firms had the financial constraints been looser.
Starting with employment growth, Figure 2 plots the difference,11 conditional on two key
parameters: the share of capital in production function (α), and the degree of substitutability
(ρ). The result is that all firms increase employment as a result of less intense financial
constraints, but the increase is higher for firms with low ρ (i.e, high degree of complementarity).
This indicates that these firms have now the opportunity to increase their capital stock, and
the higher is the complementarity, the more employment they need to complement the capital
increase.
10In particular, ε is increased by 0,10. Only firms already constrained in t = 35 are included.
11Note that in this and subsequent figures, the position of axis and scale are changed for expositional
purposes, given the 3D nature of the graph.
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Regarding productivity (Figure 3), these same firms actually decrease labour productivity
after the easing of financial constraints. Since they increase capital and labour in an almost
fixed mix, the predominant effect is the decreasing returns to scale produced by ν.
However, as ρ increases, this effect is eventually reversed, so that for firms with high
enough capital-labour substitution, productivity increases after reducing financial constraints.
And among those firms, the share of capital α is crucial in determining the size of the labour
productivity increase, with much higher increases for firms with a large α.
To sum up, after an easing of constraints, the model clearly predicts a positive effect on
employment. The sign of the effect is not so clear in terms of labour productivity, being
negative when capital and labour are complements, and positive otherwise. Finally, the size
of this last positive effect depends positively on the share of capital in the production function.
The overall effect on productivity thus remains to be an empirical question, given the lack of
general agreement on how to best quantify the elasticity of substitution between labor and
capital. In this regard, many papers provide point estimates of this elasticity at the country
and sector level (Arrow et al. (1961); Behrman (1972); Balistreri et al. (2003), among others).
Taken together, their results suggest that this elasticity of substitution moves within a wide
range of values. Furthermore, it varies greatly for different sectors within the same economy.
Consequently, we should rather let the data speak and answer this question empirically.
3.4 Implications for the joint dynamics of employment and produc-
tivity growth
So far, we have used the model to better define gazzelles in productivity, and to illustrate the
possible effects of financial restrictions on employment and labour productivity. However, in
order to tackle the last goal of the model (dynamic interactions between high growth in em-
ployment and productivity), we need to further expand the model. Without any momentum,
a firm receiving a good shock in t − 1 will on average decrease its TFP in t, by an instant
mean reversion of Ait. Therefore, high growth will be usually followed by negative growth.
Hence, the model as it is so far described cannot generate any dynamics other than negative
correlation in performance caused by mean reversion. Hence, we extend Ait to a dynamic
process including an autoregressive component, to introduce the needed momentum:
Ait = μ+ φAit−1 + ait with
⎧⎨⎩φ ∈ [0, 1)ait ∼ U(−0.05, 0.05) (12)
The inclusion of the autoregressive component can introduce different dynamics. Moreover,
its interaction with the two capital constraints already defined could further enrich dynamics.
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For example, a firm with a very good shock, financially constrained, could also exhibit high
growth in next period, even if the new shock is negative, only because it did not manage to
reach a large enough size due to the financial constraint.
In order to analyze these different dynamics, we repeat the simulation described, but for
different values of φ. For each simulation, we define HGF in employment and productivity
as in section 4.2.1. That is, the top 10% of firms with the highest “Birch-Schreyer index”12
(HGF in employment), and respectively, the top 10% of fastest growing firms in labor pro-
ductivity on a given year, conditional on its employment having not decreased in the same
period (HGF in productivity). We then plot autocorrelations and cross–correlations between
employment and labor productivity high growth. The result is in figures (4)—(7). We see
that, for low φ, autocorrelations in employment are close to zero, and increase smoothly up
to significant values as φ increases. On top of that, tighter financial constraints imply slightly
higher autocorrelations, but the effect is small compared to φ. Regarding labour productivity,
autocorrelations start negative for low φ, but soon turn to positive as φ increases beyond
some point. Again, there is a small but positive effect of tighter financial constraints on these
autocorrelations.
Regarding cross–correlations, the effect from employment to productivity is slightly nega-
tive but very close to zero for the whole domain of parameters φ and ε13. On the other hand,
the effect from productivity to employment is also slightly negative, but for high values of ε
and φ (looser constraints) it vanishes (and indeed become slightly positive).
So, in summary, the model, augmented with an autoregressive component in TFP, can
generate diverse dynamics in employment and productivity growth, depending on the degree
of inertia in TFP, and on the tightness of financial constraints. Again, it remains to be an
empirical problem to assess where actual firms lie on.
4 Data
Firm-level data are taken from the Central Balance Sheet Database (Central de Balances
Integrada (CBI) in Spanish) provided by the Banco de Espan˜a. In particular, for each firm,
we observe the main entries of the firm’s balance sheet and income statement, such as total
revenues, value of intermediate consumption, labor expenses, and book value of assets and
liabilities. In addition, the CBI database provides information on the year of foundation,
sector of activity (4-digit level), and average employment (distinguishing between permanent
and non-permanent employees).
12The Birch-Schreyer index is defined as absolute growth times relative growth in employment.
13Note the change in the vertical scale.
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Figure 6
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one is the CBA database (Central de Balances Anual in Spanish), whose input is a standard-
ized questionnaire that gathers information on the legal form, employment and balance sheet
of the firms collaborating on a voluntary basis with the Banco de Espan˜a. While the data
collected is highly detailed and reliable, the sample size is reduced, with an average of 9,000
companies submitting the survey each year, and most of them being large firms. The second
one is the CBB database, which is created in collaboration with the Mercantile Registries
where firms deposit their annual accounts. In Spain, since 1990 trading companies (sociedades
mercantiles in Spanish) have the legal obligation to deposit their annual financial statements
on the Mercantile Registry of the province in which their registered office is located. This
results in a wide coverage of all active firms each year, with the caveat that the compilation
and cleaning of the dataset implies keeping only the readable and quality-printed statements,
and those with coherent figures (e.g., total assets equal to total liabilities, labor expenses in
line with the employment data reported, etc.). Nevertheless, advances in information tech-
nologies have allowed consistent data collection of between 400,000 and 600,000 firms in the
last years, which represent more than 50% of the population of active firms in Spain. Despite
this, it is common to find firms with coherent statements that “disappear” one year from
the CBB database, and appear again some year(s) after. Benefiting from the fact that firms
must report comparable figures of the previous year when filing the annual accounts of a given
year, the Banco de Espan˜a Central Balance Sheet Office (in charge of maintaining the CBI
database) fills (if possible) the missing data generated when firms “disappear”, thus increasing
the availability of consecutive firm observations.
In order to analyze the role of financial constraints in productivity and employment growth,
we cross the firm-level data provided by the CBI with information on loan applications and
current credit exposures from the Central Credit Register14 of the Banco de Espan˜a (Central
de Informacio´n de Riesgos (CIR) in Spanish), using firms’ unique fiscal identification number.
This dataset is maintained by the Banco de Espan˜a in its role as primary banking supervisory
agency, and contains detailed monthly information on all outstanding loans over 6,000 euros
to non-financial firms granted by all banks operating in Spain since 1984. Given the low
reporting threshold, virtually all firms with outstanding bank debt will appear in the CIR.
In its role of assisting banks in controlling their credit risk, the CIR provides banks with
two types of reports. On the one hand, all banks receive, on a monthly and automated basis,
updated information on the total current debts of their own current borrowers vis-a`-vis all
credit entities in Spain (face value, default risk, maturity, guarantees, etc.). On the other
hand, any bank can request (at zero cost) this information on firms that may become new
borrowers, though the law stipulates that the prospective borrower must give its consent, thus
14Further details on the contents and maintenance of the CIR can be found in http://www.bde.es/bde/
en/secciones/informes/
The CBI is the result of integrating and aggregating two complementary datasets. The first
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signaling the firm’s real intent to obtain credit. This in turn implies that banks will lodge
requests only following loan applications and in one of the following situations: either the
bank has never granted any type of lending to the firm, or the lending relationship between
the firm and the bank ended before the request was made.
Since 2002 the CIR compiles monthly information on these requests, uniquely identifying
firm-bank pairs. We extract information on the total number of requests made on a given firm
each year, as well as the total number of those requests that ended in the granting of credit.
We assume the credit application was accepted if the bank declares some credit exposure with
the firm at most three months after the request was made. Furthermore, we also retrieve firm-
year information on the average drawable and drawn down credit, as well as on the average
number of outstanding credits.
4.1 Sample
Using the Central Balance Sheet Database, we extract data on a representative sample of
non-financial non-agricultural firms, covering the period 2001 – 2013. This leaves us with an
unbalanced panel of 1,416,518 firms that we observe for an average of 5.3 years, amounting
to 7,538,516 firm-year observations. Next we match this data, on a yearly basis, with the
information from the Credit Register, using firm’s fiscal ID number.
In spite of the fact that the CBI data is available since 1995, we set the starting point
of our sample at 2001. The reason for this is twofold. On the one hand, the information on
banks’ requests on prospective borrowers – central to our analysis of financial constraints – is
only observable since 2002. On the other hand, we start collecting balance sheet data from
2001 (instead of 2002), since 2001 annual accounts are needed to compute our measures of
employment and productivity growth for the fiscal year 2002.
As it was mentioned earlier, our balance sheet data draws mainly on the annual accounts
filed by firms in their corresponding Mercantile Registries. Although this provides us with
a wide coverage of financial and accounting information at the firm level, a major concern
arises when it comes to employment data. Specifically, firms are not compelled to report
average employment when depositing their annual accounts. This in turn implies that we
lose 1,589,349 observations for having missing values for the number of employees. We also
exclude firms with a reported average employment of less than one, since these firms are likely
to exhibit a very erratic behavior and the overall reliability of their financial statements tends
to be rather small. Furthermore, we drop firms for which the year of constitution is missing
(we need this to compute firm’s age), observations with non-positive values for age, and those
in which negative net equity amounted to more than half the value of total assets. Moreover,
to avoid the influence of outliers, we drop observations at the top and bottom 1% of labor
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Table 2: Sequential data cleansing process
Data cleansing stage No obs. No firms
Raw data 7,538,516 1,416,518
Missing employment data -1,589,349
Average no employees < 1 -322,086
Missing year of foundation -2,196
Non-positive age -2,369
Negative net equity > 50% Total Assets -367,985
Top and bottom 1% of labor expenses per employee and GVA -191,036
Cleaned data 5,063,495 955,690
Obs. not belonging to spell of at least 3 consecutive data points -2,244,937
Missing values in regressors -41,192
Estimation sample 2,777,366 623,072
expenses per employee and deflated gross value added per employee15 by year and 2-digit
sector. Table 2 summarizes the data cleansing process here described.
At this point, we are left with 955,690 firms, and 5,063,495 observations. However, as it will
become clear in subsequent sections, the computation of growth rates and the inclusion of a
lagged dependent variable among the regressors, implies that spells of firm observations with
less than 3 consecutive data points will be automatically excluded from our estimation sample.
It is at this stage where the sample size is dramatically reduced by over 40%, leaving us with
2,777,366 observations. Despite these data limitations, our sample remains remarkably large
and thorough, with around 252,000 active firms per year and an average of 4.5 observations
per firm.
In order to extend inferences drawn from our data to the universe of Spanish firms, we first
verify that the distribution of firms in our final sample is representative of the reference pop-
ulation. Table 3 breaks down firms by size category and compares the distribution of sample
firms to that of the population of Spanish firms for the period 2002 – 2012, as provided by the
Central Directory of Firms (DIRCE in Spanish). In general, although medium firms (10 – 49
employees) are a bit overrepresented in detriment of small ones, the representativeness of our
final sample is substantially good, specially in the last years of study. Unfortunately, we don’t
have population distributions for variables such as gross valued added or labor productivity,
thus we cannot readily check whether our sample of firms is representative in this respect.
15Given that financial statements are reported in nominal terms, we employ the value added deflator from
the Spanish National Accounts, constructed at the 2-digit sector level with 2010 as the base year.
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Table 3: Size distribution of firms (Business census vs Final sample)
Firm size cateogory Panel A: Central Business Register (number of firms and share by employment size)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
1-9 employees 521,945 555,442 592,875 624,678 651,899 689,095 719,884 705,950 685,023 666,620 658,036 7,071,447
10-19 employees 74,900 77,776 81,561 84,464 89,009 92,398 94,092 87,285 75,394 72,210 67,271 896,360
20-49 employees 44,663 45,405 46,930 49,705 51,910 53,764 54,764 49,089 42,448 39,956 37,013 515,647
+50 employees 21,343 21,790 21,871 23,043 24,138 25,470 26,417 23,700 21,402 20,373 19,552 249,099
Total 662,851 700,413 743,237 781,890 816,956 860,727 895,157 866,024 824,267 799,159 781,872 8,732,553
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
1-9 employees 78.7% 79.3% 79.8% 79.9% 79.8% 80.1% 80.4% 81.5% 83.1% 83.4% 84.2% 81.0%
10-19 employees 11.3% 11.1% 11.0% 10.8% 10.9% 10.7% 10.5% 10.1% 9.1% 9.0% 8.6% 10.3%
20-49 employees 6.7% 6.5% 6.3% 6.4% 6.4% 6.2% 6.1% 5.7% 5.1% 5.0% 4.7% 5.9%
+50 employees 3.2% 3.1% 2.9% 2.9% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 2.7% 2.6% 2.5% 2.5% 2.9%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Firm size cateogory Panel B: Final Sample (number of firms and share by employment size)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
1-9 employees 131,553 153,723 173,534 188,300 189,791 183,550 192,037 231,926 233,304 229,980 206,467 2,114,165
10-19 employees 28,151 31,809 34,748 36,945 36,655 34,834 34,721 37,815 36,806 35,323 29,958 377,765
20-49 employees 16,542 18,720 20,318 21,757 21,179 19,857 19,386 20,767 20,479 19,851 16,587 215,443
+50 employees 5,202 5,847 6,443 7,028 6,804 6,091 5,962 6,669 6,831 6,979 6,137 69,993
Total 181,448 210,099 235,043 254,030 254,429 244,332 252,106 297,177 297,420 292,133 259,149 2,777,366
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
1-9 employees 72.5% 73.2% 73.8% 74.1% 74.6% 75.1% 76.2% 78.0% 78.4% 78.7% 79.7% 76.1%
10-19 employees 15.5% 15.1% 14.8% 14.5% 14.4% 14.3% 13.8% 12.7% 12.4% 12.1% 11.6% 13.6%
20-49 employees 9.1% 8.9% 8.6% 8.6% 8.3% 8.1% 7.7% 7.0% 6.9% 6.8% 6.4% 7.8%
+50 employees 2.9% 2.8% 2.7% 2.8% 2.7% 2.5% 2.4% 2.2% 2.3% 2.4% 2.4% 2.5%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Notes: Only public limited company and limited liability companies are included.
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4.2 Variable definitions
4.2.1 Definition of HGFs
A controversial issue in this field of research is the considerable heterogeneity in terms of
how HGFs are selected. In their taxonomy of the literature on high growth firms, Delmar
et al. (2003) point out four important factors that shape this heterogeneity when it comes
to identifying HGF: the indicator variable (i.e., the variable over which we measure growth),
the measurement of growth (relative vs. absolute change), the time window studied, and the
criteria for screening out HGF.
The most commonly used indicators in the literature are sales and employment, partly due
to the relative easiness to access data on them, but also because empirical evidence suggests
they are moderately correlated (Coad, 2010), and hence results do not change much upon
deciding between the two. However, the results in Daunfeldt et al. (2014) suggests there
exists a trade-off between employment growth and productivity growth, meaning that HGF
in terms of employment are not the same as HGF in terms of productivity.
Taken this into account, we define two types of HGF: HGF in terms of employment, using
the average number of employees as indicator, and HGF in terms of productivity, using labor
productivity (defined as deflated gross value added (GVA) per employee) as indicator.
On the other hand, measuring growth in relative, as opposed to absolute terms (and
viceversa) can considerably change the group of firms selected as HGF (Almus, 2002; Daunfeldt
et al., 2014). Relative changes in growth may be considerably higher for small firms than for
larger ones (for instance, a one-employee firm that hires an additional staff member would
exhibit a 100% rate of growth), resulting in smaller HGF. Conversely, measures of absolute
growth would introduce a bias towards larger firms, in detriment of smaller ones. Many studies
alleviate this concern by requiring sample firms to have a minimum employment size (usually
more than 10 or 20 employees). However, in the case of Spain, that would imply ignoring
more than 90% of firms, and thus not taking into consideration a large part of the business
dynamics. This is why, in the case of HGF in employment we opt for the so-called “Birch-
Schreyer Index” as our measure of growth, which combines both absolute and relative growth
and is defined as:
BS = (Li,t − Li,t−k) Li,t
Li,t−k
(13)
with Li,t and Li,t−k representing the average number of employees reported by a given firm i
at time t and t− k, respectively.
This composite measure of employment growth, jointly put forward by the work of Schreyer
(2000) and Birch (1987), is certainly less sensitive to biases favoring any particular firm size
category, since it gives emphasis to larger (smaller) firms whose relative growth rates cor-
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respond to larger (smaller) absolute growth increments. In the case of HGF in terms of
productivity, these type of biases are less pervasive, since our indicator variable, total GVA
over firm employment, is already correcting for differences in firm size, and it further controls
for the intermediate input usage (Gal, 2013). As a result, we employ the relative change in
labor productivity as our measure of productivity growth16:
Labor productivity growth (%) =
⎛⎝ GV Ai,tLi,t
GV Ai,t−k
Li,t−k
− 1
⎞⎠× 100 (14)
where GV Ai,t and GV Ai,t−k are the deflated gross value added (in K euros) reported by firm
i at time t and t− k, respectively, and Li,t and Li,t−k are defined as previously.
As for the time horizon considered, most studies compute growth rates over long periods
(usually between 3 and 5 years), in order to smooth the distribution of growth rates and
correct for one-time growth peaks. However, there are HGF studies that use shorter time
horizons (1 or 2 years) (see Lopez-Garcia and Puente (2012); Lee (2014)). In our case, data
limitations hinder our ability to measure growth over long time periods. Given that we have
an unbalanced panel with an average of 5.3 observations per firm, we measure growth over a
one-year period, that is, we set k equal to one.
Next we need to set the criteria for screening out HGF. Studies in the literature has mainly
used two distinct definitions. One the one hand, some definitions are based on a certain cutoff
or threshold (usually 10%, 5% or 1%) that identifies the top x% fastest growing firms during
a particular period. On the other hand, other definitions, require firms to grow at a particular
pace. This is the case for the Eurostat-OECD definition, which identifies HGF as firms with
at least 10 employees in the starting period, and an annualized employment growth exceeding
20% during a 3-year period (Eurostat-OECD, 2007). One important advantage of the latter
type of (absolute) definitions over the former (relative) ones is that they are time-invariant, so
that the definition of HGF is always identifying the same patterns of growth. The drawback
is that the number of HGF is highly sensitive to changes in the business cycle and the sector
composition. Given that our sample spans periods of both economic expansion and financial
turmoil, we decided for a relative measure.
Consequently, a firm is identified as a HGF in employment in a given year if it belongs
to the top 10% of firms with the highest “Birch-Schreyer index” in the same 2-digit sector17.
Similarly, for a firm to be classified as a HGF in productivity, it must be among the 10%18
16In any case, selecting HGF in productivity with an indicator analogous to 13 yields almost the same set
of firms.
17To define HGF, the year-sector cell must have at least 25 observations.
18In Appendix C we repeat our analysis using two different cutoffs to select HGF, namely the top 1% and
5% of fastest growing firms in labor productivity, and the top 1% and 5% of firms with the highest “Birch-
Schreyer index”. Tables C.3–C.7 use HGF selected under top 1% cutoff, and are analogous to tables 6–10.
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of firms with the fastest growth in labor productivity in the same 2-digit sector, under the
condition that its employment has not decreased in the same period. This last requirement
avoids classifying as a HGF those firms that are in distress or going through a rough patch,
and that are thus boosting their labor productivity through massive dismissals19. This caveat
is specially relevant in our analysis since we focus on yearly growth rates (likely, if we used
wider time windows to compute growth rates, this would be less of a problem).
4.2.2 Financial constraints
We use the information on credit requests from the CIR to construct a categorical variable
that measures firm’s financial constraints. Firms are classified into four distinct groups:
1. The first group is comprised of firms that apply for credit to one or more new banks
(i.e., any bank with which the firm has no lending relationship at the time of the loan
application) and obtain credit from at least one of them.
2. In the second group fall firms that have covered their need of additional funds with their
current banks. To be precise, these are firms that are not in group 1, and that fulfill at
least one of the following conditions: (a) the stock of credit vis-a`-vis all its current lenders
has increased with respect to the previous year, (b) the average number of outstanding
credits vis-a`-vis its current lenders has increased w.r.t the previous year, (c) firm has
unused credit facilities amounting to more than half of the total credit exposure vis-a`-vis
its current lenders (meaning it still has plenty of room for drawing down credit).
3. In the third group appear firms that make credit requests to one or more new banks
but all of them get rejected. Moreover, we require firms in this group to not having
increased their debt with current lenders. That is, a firm that is denied credit by all new
banks but that, in spite of that, obtains more funds from current lenders (as defined in
2) would be included in group 2.
4. The last category works as a “catch-all” solution, where one can find either firms that
haven’t approached new banks and that satisfy none of the conditions listed in 2, or
firms that don’t appear in the CIR database (i.e., they have no credit exposures with
any banking institution reporting to the Credit Register). This group of firms act as the
base category in all regressions.
In a nutshell, firms may be granted new loans from a new bank(s) (category 1), or they
may borrow more credit from their current lenders (category 2), after (or not) having been
Similarly, tables C.8–C.12 use HGF selected under top 5% cutoff, and are equivalent to tables 6–10. Results
are barely unchanged when we use 5% as the cutoff point, and are weaker (though the sign and direction of
the coefficients is the same) in the 1% case.
19Our theoretical model lends further support to this requirement for HGF in productivity (see section 3).
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rejected by all new banks to which they applied for credit. On the other hand, firms may
be denied credit by all new banks, as well as by their current lenders20 (category 3). The
remaining firms (i.e., firms with no declared bank debt or no increases in credit with current
nor new banks) would fall in category 4.
Consequently, firms in groups 1 and 2 are regarded as the least financially constrained
of all, since they are able to obtain more funds either through current or new lenders. By
contrast, firms in category 3 are the most financially constrained, due to their inability to
raise new funds either through new or current lenders.
To lend further support to the validity of our methodology, we compared our measure
of financial constraints to the responses of a subset of sample firms to the Wage Dynamic
Network (WDN) survey, in which, firms were explicitly asked, among other things, about the
pervasiveness of the financial constraints they might have faced during 2010-201321. We find
a positive and statistically significant correlation between our measure of financial constraints
and the degree of financial constraints declared by the same firms in the WDN survey22.
An important factor affecting firm’s ability to access new credit, and hence, finance growth,
is its capital structure. On the one hand, sufficiently high leverage may make it more difficult to
get additional funds to finance growth due to the debt overhang created by prior debt financing,
and the increased probability of financial distress (Myers, 1977; Titman, 1984). These agency
problems are especially severe for small firms since they are more informationally opaque than
larger firms. On the other hand, high debt ratios may send a signal about the firms ability to
face fixed debt-related payments, and thus could result in lower financing constraints if the firm
has built a good credit history. To control for the correlation between leverage and financial
constraints, we include the share of long term debt over total liabilities as a regressor. We
further include a quadratic term for long term debt ratio to capture potential non-monotonic
effects of leverage.
20Note that we are unable to explicitly observe whether a firm that approaches new banks for funding,
has first resorted to its current lenders and the latter have denied this additional credit (since the firm’s
current lenders would not need to lodge a request to the Credit Register, given that they already receive
this information on an automated monthly fashion). However, the fact that the firm doesn’t increase funds
vis-a`-vis its current lenders, while having applied for credit to other banks, implicitly signals that the firm
may be somehow constrained by its current lenders.
21For more information on the survey and the Wage Dynamics research Network, visit http://www.ecb.
europa.eu/pub/economic-research/research-networks/html/researcher_wdn.en.html
22In particular, we use data coming from the third wave of the WDN survey, which aims to assess recent
labor market adjustments and how firms have reacted to the labor market reforms that took place between
2010 and 2013. At present, 25 EU National Central Banks participate in this research network, including
Banco de Espan˜a. We match this survey data with our database and identify 1,688 firms that completed the
WDN survey. At some point in the questionnaire, firms are asked about how badly the shortage of credit and
the tightening of financial conditions have affected them in terms of higher difficulties to cover basic financial
needs, make new investments or refinance outstanding debt. Firms answering that (any of) these factors have
affected them in a “relevant” or “very relevant” way are thought of as being financially constrained. We then
compare this synthetic variable of financial constraints to ours, and find a positive and statistically significant
correlation between them.
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4.2.3 Control variables
The empirical literature on firm dynamics has recurrently emphasized the large impact that
firm demographics, such as firm size and firm age, have on firm growth and job creation
(Haltiwanger et al., 2013), and therefore they need to be considered. Thus we include firm
size and firm age fixed effects in all of our regressions. On the one hand, firms are classified,
according to their average employment, into micro (1-9 employees), small (10-19 employees),
medium (20-49 employees) or large (more than 50 employees) enterprises. Given the nature
of our data, it is not surprising that micro and small firms are overrepresented, covering
90 percent of the sample, whereas large firms comprise less than 3 percent of the sample.
On the other hand, we define six groups of age ranging from newborn firms (0-2 years old),
representing only 7 percent of the sample, to old firms (21 years or older) which constitute
over 12 percent of the firms in the sample (see Tables 4 and 5 for further details).
The literature on the role of international trade in promoting growth in general, and pro-
ductivity in particular, has for long emphasized firm’s participation in international markets
as a relevant factor affecting firm and productivity growth (see Wagner (2007) and Green-
away and Kneller (2007)). In particular, the majority of studies in this field find a positive
link between participation in international markets and firm’s productivity, documenting a
productivity premium vis-a`-vis firms that do not trade internationally. Given that being an
exporter and/or importer is often regarded as an indicator of internationalization, we match
information on importer/exporter status from the microdata used to construct the Spanish
Balance of Payments. We include these two dummy variables as regressors to correct for the
impact of international trade on the probability of becoming a HGF in productivity and em-
ployment growth. The final sample contains an average number of 12,605 (16,933) exporters
(importers) per year, of which an average of 6,846 are two-way traders (that both export and
import).
Being one of the key firm inputs, human capital has also been put forward as a source of
firm-level heterogeneity in productivity, growth, and value (Abowd et al., 2005). We therefore
introduce human capital controls in all specifications. In particular, we include as a regressor
the firm’s wage premium (in logarithmic terms), that we compute as the average wage paid
in the firm23 over the average wage paid by other firms in its 2-digit sector. On the other
hand, one needs to control for the composition of firms’ staff in order to correctly interpret the
heterogeneity in average wages across firms. Ideally, we would control for characteristics such
as level of education or tenure, however, this information is unobservable for us. Nevertheless,
we do have information on the fraction of permanent employees working at the firm and include
this as an additional regressor. The strong duality of the Spanish labor market lowers skill-
23We use personnel expenses per worker as a proxy for wages.
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building incentives in the temporary work segment, which in turn may affect negatively the
productivity of these workers. Thus, controlling for the mix between permanent and temporary
contracts is crucial, especially when analyzing Spanish firms, given the high incidence of
temporary contracts in Spain. We expect both these variables to measure firm’s ability to
accumulate human capital, thereby affecting its growth prospects.
4.3 A characterization of Spanish HGF
Contribution to employment and productivity growth
Graphs 8 and 9 present the contribution of HGF to aggregate employment growth and aggre-
gate labor productivity growth, respectively. By aggregate, we refer to the totals for studied
firms. For comparison purposes, non-HGF are further broken down into two groups: slow
growth firms (with non-negative changes in labor productivity/employment, but not large
enough to be considered a HGF) and shrinking firms (with negative changes in labor produc-
tivity/employment).
In the years preceding the financial crisis, the overall creation of jobs attributable to HGF
was of such a scale that it more than made up for the job destruction induced by shrinking firms
in the sample. Taking the period 2006–2007 as example, we observe that HGF accounting
for 10% of the studied firms in 2007, created 235,965 jobs, almost two times the figure of
net employment of that year (135,501 jobs), and more than offsetting the whole of the jobs
destroyed by shrinking firms (-160,435 jobs) (see Table A.1).
The contribution of HGF to job creation is non-negligible either in the post-crisis, when
these firms offset on average a 67% of the jobs destroyed during the 2007 – 2012 period.
Moreover, they added about 85% of the total new jobs, or in other words, they provided
almost six times more jobs than slow growth firms (before 2007, the gap between HGF and
slow growth firms was smaller, with HGF creating around 3.5 times more jobs than slow
growth firms).
Regardless of the criteria used to identify HGF in employment, most of the empirical
evidence coincides with this result. In recent work, Lopez-Garcia and Puente (2012) find that
7.7% of HGF account for roughly 80% of the total net employment creation among firms
with less than 20 employees in Spain. In Finland, Deschryvere (2008) finds that the top 5%
of rapid growth firms generate 90% of all net jobs in the economy. In UK, the 7% of firms
selected as HGF according to the Eurostat-OECD definition, created around half of all gross
new employment between 2007 and 2010 (NESTA, 2011).
The impact of productivity HGF on aggregate labor productivity is much smaller than
that made by employment HGF on aggregate net employment (see Graph 9 and Table A.2).
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Graph 8 Contribution to employment growtha
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aFigures represented in the chart are computed as follows. Each year (t) firms are classified into one of the following groups:
HGF in employment (top 10% of firms with the highest “Birch-Schreyer index” in the same 2-digit sector), slow growth firms
(firms that don’t qualify as HGF but that either kept their employment constant or increased it), and shrinking firms (firms that
don’t qualify as HGF but that decreased their employment). We then compute firms’ absolute change in the number of employees
from t− 1 to t, and sum it all up across firms within the same group. See Table A.1 for further details.
Graph 9 Contribution to labor productivity growhtb,c
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bThe contribution of the different reference groups (i.e., HGF, slow growth firms and shrinking firms) to overall labor
productivity growth is computed as follows. First we calculate the growth in productivity for all studied firms had the reference
group not grown. We do this by setting the labor productivity growth of the reference group to zero; in particular, we set the
deflated GVA to a level such that GVA per employee from t − 1 to t remains unchanged. Then we compute the growth rate in
labor productivity from t− 1 to t as:
Labor productivity growth t (%) =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
n∑
i=1
GV Ai,t
n∑
i=1
Li,t
/ n∑
i=1
GV Ai,t−1
n∑
i=1
Li,t−1
− 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠× 100
Secondly, we define the contribution of each group to overall growth as the difference between overall (actual) growth for all
studied firms and the rate of growth for all studied firms had the reference firms’ not grown. See Table A.2 for further details.
cThe thick brown line represents the annual rate of growth of labor productivity for the whole estimation sample, regardless
of the HGF status (i.e., whether high-growth, slow growth or shrinking firm). Note that this aggregate statistic that we compute is
not readily comparable with the evolution of labor productivity in Spain for the same time period coming from National Accounts.
Two factors that may explain this discrepancy is, first, that we compute productivity growth in a given year t for surviving firms
between at least t− 1 and t, and secondly, that we work with an unbalanced panel of firms, likely affected by attrition.
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firms, the same is not true for productivity gazelles. That is, the contribution of productivity
HGF to aggregate productivity is roughly a third of that made by slow growing firms. On the
other hand, unlike employment HGF, the contribution of productivity HGF is rather stable
over time, moving around the 1.5 p.p threshold throughout the studied period, though there
are marked differences across sectors.
A potential explanation for the lower contribution of productivity HGF to aggregate pro-
ductivity growth, in comparison with the employment counterparts, could be related to the
way in which the two types of HGF are selected. That is, while HGF in employment are
selected based on a growth index that combines relative and absolute growth in employment,
HGF in productivity are selected based on relative growth rates of labor productivity. How-
ever, applying the spirit of the Birch-Schreyer Index (absolute growth times relative growth)
to our measure of labor productivity, and selecting as HGF the top 10% of firms with the
highest score in this index (in the same 2-digit sector) leads us to select practically the same
group of firms as productivity gazelles. All in all, while figures are not as impressive as for
employment, the impact of these rapid growing firms on labor productivity is non-trivial,
taking into account that they only represent a 10% of studied firms.
Age and size distribution of HGF
Overall, these numbers show that productivity growth and most of all, job creation, are very
much concentrated in a few rapidly-growing firms, suggesting that firm growth rates resemble a
Laplace “tent-shape” distribution, as Bottazzi and Secchi (2006) claim. As a result, researchers
and policy makers have focused their attention on the characteristics of these HGF. Overall,
there is much consensus on that HGF tend to be younger than the average firm in the industry.
Accordingly, among both the productivity and employment HGF of our sample, young firms
(less than 5 years old) are overrepresented in comparison with the distribution of non-HGF
(see Table 4).
It is also interesting to note that while the distribution of studied firms across age categories
is very similar between HGF in employment and HGF in productivity, the same is not true
when we observe the size class distribution of HGF. In particular, firms with fewer than
10 employees are overrepresented among HGF in productivity, but largely underrepresented
across HGF in employment; the reverse happens when we focus on larger firms (more than
20 employees) (compare Panels A and B of Table 5). One possible explanation might be that
new firms entering the market are uncertain about their productivity, their costs structures or
their capacity; as this uncertainty disappears, firms invest in growth or exit (Jovanovic, 1982).
This means that achieving a certain size might be a necessary (yet not sufficient) condition to
start being a productive firm.
In particular, while HGF in employment added significantly more jobs than slow growing
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Table 4: Age distribution of HGF
Panel A: HGF in productivity by firm age category
Firm age category non-HGF HGF Total
0-2 years old 140,857 5.6% 49,231 17.9% 190,088 6.8%
3-5 years old 402,988 16.1% 56,052 20.4% 459,040 16.5%
6-10 years old 706,363 28.2% 70,035 25.5% 776,398 28.0%
11-15 years old 589,579 23.6% 50,323 18.3% 639,902 23.0%
16-20 years old 360,577 14.4% 28,597 10.4% 389,174 14.0%
21 or more years old 301,914 12.1% 20,850 7.6% 322,764 11.6%
Total observations 2,502,278 100.0% 275,088 100.0% 2,777,366 100.0%
Panel B: HGF in employment by firm age category
Firm age category non-HGF HGF Total
0-2 years old 149,208 6.0% 40,880 14.5% 190,088 6.8%
3-5 years old 407,894 16.4% 51,146 18.1% 459,040 16.5%
6-10 years old 706,288 28.3% 70,110 24.8% 776,398 28.0%
11-15 years old 585,842 23.5% 54,060 19.1% 639,902 23.0%
16-20 years old 355,535 14.3% 33,639 11.9% 389,174 14.0%
21 or more years old 289,874 11.6% 32,890 11.6% 322,764 11.6%
Total observations 2,494,641 100.0% 282,725 100.0% 2,777,366 100.0%
Table 5: Size distribution of HGF
Panel A: HGF in productivity by firm size category
Firm size category non-HGF HGF Total
1-9 employees 1,876,073 75.0% 238,092 86.6% 2,114,165 76.1%
10-19 employees 355,177 14.2% 22,588 8.2% 377,765 13.6%
20-49 employees 204,254 8.2% 11,189 4.1% 215,443 7.8%
+50 employees 66,774 2.7% 3,219 1.2% 69,993 2.5%
Total observations 2,502,278 100.0% 275,088 100.0% 2,777,366 100.0%
Panel B: HGF in employment by firm size category
Firm size category non-HGF HGF Total
1-9 employees 1,975,526 79.2% 138,639 49.0% 2,114,165 76.1%
10-19 employees 315,931 12.7% 61,834 21.9% 377,765 13.6%
20-49 employees 161,771 6.5% 53,672 19.0% 215,443 7.8%
+50 employees 41,413 1.7% 28,580 10.1% 69,993 2.5%
Total observations 2,494,641 100.0% 282,725 100.0% 2,777,366 100.0%
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5 Empirical specification
Our empirical model is based on the following specification:24
HGFi,t = γHGFi,t−1 + βxi,t−1 + δt + ηi + vi,t (15)
where HGFi,t is a dummy that takes the value one if firm i (i = 1, ..., N) in year t (t = 1, ..., T )
is a high-growth firm, and zero otherwise. The HGF labeling may refer to either employment
or productivity as dicussed above. xi,t−1 is a vector of covariates such as firm’s age, size, wage
premium, share of permanent workers, and importer/exporter status. Crucially, the vector
xi,t−1 also contains the financial constraints indicators described above. Moreover, persistence
and mean-reverting dynamics of the high-growth status are captured by the coefficient of the
lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side. ηi captures firm-specific fixed heterogeneity
potentially correlated with the rest of variables on the right-hand side, and δt represents a set
of time-specific shocks common to all firms in our sample. Finally, transitory shocks to firm’s
growth and other omitted factors in the model are represented in the term vi,t.
Equation (15) can be estimated under different correlation structures between the the error
term δt+ηi+vit and the regressors xi,t−1, HGFi,t−1. Despite we are aware of the limitations of
certain exogeneity assumptions when estimating dynamic panel models, we still consider these
strategies in order to ensure comparability with previous papers in the literature and also to
explore the direction of the expected biases from OLS-based estimators in this setting. To
be more concrete, we first consider pooled OLS, which assumes that the firm-specific effects
are uncorrelated with the variables on the right hand-side. Second, we allow for correlation
between the firm-specific effects (ηi) and the variables on the right hand-side. Fixed effects
estimates accommodate this correlation and are consistent as N → ∞ and T → ∞.
With respect to the correlation between the transitory shock vi,t and the regressors, we
consider two different working hypothesis in this paper. We first estimate the model under
the strict exogeneity assumption presented in equation (16) which implies that both lagged
HGF (HGFi,t−1) and lagged covariates (xi,t−1) are uncorrelated with the full path of shocks
vi = (vi,1, ..., vi,t, ..., vi,T )
′:
E(vi,t | HGFi, xi, δt, ηi) = 0 (16)
where HGFi and xi are the T × 1 vectors (HGFi1, ..., HGFiT )′ and (xi1, ..., xiT )′. Standard
fixed effects estimators are based on this assumption, which does not hold by definition because
HGFit−1 is correlated with vi,s for s < t, when T is small (Nickell, 1981). Moreover, under
24Since we are mainly interested in average marginal effects, throughout our regressions we focus on a
linear specification, treating our dummy of HGF as continuous. However, we also considered the non-linear
case in separate regressions. In appendix C, we perform random effects probit regressions a` la Wooldridge,
and compare the average marginal effects with those of the fixed effects estimations described in the main text
(see tables C.1 and C.2). As expected, the results remain virtually the same.
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the strict exogeneity assumption, feedback from HGF to the covariates is not allowed (i.e.
covariates such as firm size or credit constraints are not affected by changes in the HGF
status).
In order to alleviate these two limitations of the strict exogeneity assumption in (16), we
also consider the following working hypothesis:
E(vi,t | HGF t−1i , xt−1i , δt, ηi) = 0 (17)
where HGF t−1i and x
t−1
i are the (t−1)×1 vectors (HGFi,1, ..., HGFi,t−1)′ and (xi,1, ..., xi,t−1)′.
We label this assumption as predeterminedness because all past shocks up to the current period
(t) (vi,1, ..., vi,t) affect not only HGF (HGFi,t) but also other firm characteristics included in
the vector of covariates xi,t. However, future shocks (vi,t+1, ..., vi,T ) are uncorrelated with both
current HGF and current firm characteristics.
Therefore, we allow for feedback effects from changes in HGF status to changes in firm
characteristics which seems to us a desirable property.25 In order to accommodate the prede-
terminedness assumption in (17), and given the dimensions of our panel dataset,26 we resort to
panel GMM estimators advanced by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991).
The intuition behind these panel GMM estimators is that lagged levels of the right-hand-side
variables are used as instruments for the same variables in first differences.27
The most important reason, but also the most controversial one, that justifies our pref-
erence for the Arellano-Bond estimator over within-groups, is the aim to give a causal inter-
pretation to our estimates. To be more concrete, our estimates are robust to feedback from
high-growth episodes to other firm characteristics. However, this type of estimators is also
interesting in this context because firms characteristics used in this study are likely to have
measurement error. The within-group transformation may exacerbate the attenuation bias
due to measurement error while, under some conditions, panel GMM estimators are robust to
measurement error in regressors.28
25In addition to strict exogeneity and predeterminedness, there is also a third possible configuration labeled
as strict endogeneity in which HGF and firm characteristics are correlated with the full path of shocks from
t = 1 to T . Estimating the model under this assumption would require the availability of additional firm-
specific time-varying variables uncorrelated with past, present and future shocks to firms’ growth but correlated
with other firm characteristics. Given the difficulty and controversy of this task we prefer to work with the
somehow less ambitious predeterminedness assumption.
26The panel dataset we consider has T = 10 and N ≈ 600, 000, so small T oriented estimators seem to be
more appropriate than other time-series oriented estimators such as Anderson and Hsiao (1982)
27Note also that the first stage coefficients in this GMM framework proliferate as T increases and this
might cause a problem of overfitting. In order to alleviate this concern, we only exploit one instrument —the
first available lag— for each regressor and time period instead of the full path of available instruments. This
strategy precludes the consideration of Sargan-type tests of overidentifying restrictions, which, in any case,
would present extremely low power in our setting (see e.g. Bowsher (2002)).
28Whenever measurement error is free of serial correlation, the panel dimension of the data is helpful for
dealing with attenuation bias because it provides internal instruments. See Griliches and Hausman (1986) for
further discussion.
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Finally, we do not consider the so-called system-GMM estimator because it requires an
additional identifying assumption for consistency (Blundell and Bond, 1998). In particular, it
relies on the mean stationarity assumption that has been proved to be controversial in most
empirical settings. Intuitively, this assumption requires that the variables observed in the data
set come from dynamic processes that started in the distant past so that the have already
reached their steady state distribution, which is hard to motivate in panels with many young
firms.
The univariate AR specification in (15) does not allow for interactions between high-growth
episodes in employment and productivity. In order to explore how HGF in employment affects
HGF in productivity and vice versa, our preferred specification is given by a bivariate VAR
that captures these potential interactions:
HGFEi,t = γEEHGF
E
i,t−1 + γEPHGF
P
i,t−1 + βExi,t−1 + δ
E
t + η
E
i + v
E
i,t (18)
HGF Pi,t = γPEHGF
E
i,t−1 + γPPHGF
P
i,t−1 + βPxi,t−1 + δ
P
t + η
P
i + v
P
i,t (19)
where HGFEi,t refers to high-growth in terms of employment while HGF
P
i,t corresponds to
high-growth in terms of productivity. As discussed above, we consider two identification
assumptions based on (16) and (17) but including the additional regressors HGFEi,t−1 and
HGF Pi,t−1 in the conditioning set. Therefore, high-growth in terms of employment is allowed
to affect high-growth in terms of productivity, and vice versa. Finally, we separately estimate
both equations despite it might possible to improve the efficiency by jointly estimating the two
equations given that joint GMM estimates would use a weight matrix that takes into account
the correlation between the moment conditions of the HGFE and HGF P equations. However,
note that consistency properties are not affected by joint estimation of the two equations (see
Arellano (2003)).
6 Results
We first present in Table 6 the results of univariate models. For each dependent variable
(HGF in employment, HGF in productivity), we present three estimations. The first one is
a simple OLS estimation. The second one controls for unobserved heterogeneity, by adding
fixed effects. Finally, the third one uses the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator, as described
above, to control for possible feedback of high growth episodes on other firms’ characteristics.
Focusing now on first column of Table 6, we see that high growth in employment has
significant persistence, as evidenced by the positive coefficient of the lagged high growth
variable. Indeed, the effect is large (0.072 for a dependent variable with mean .1, by definition).
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term leverage ratio (and square, to capture non-linearity), and the other one measures access
to new credit, as explained before. The results for the leverage ratio yield an inverted U-shape
pattern, with additional increments of long term debt having a positive effect on probability of
high growth in employment practically on the entire domain of the long term debt ratio. This
means that the vast majority of studied firms would benefit from raising new long-term debt.
Regarding access to new credit, firms getting an approval for a new loan with a new bank have
highest probability, followed by firms that obtain new credit from their current lenders. Firms
asking for a new one, but getting none have a smaller probability of becoming a HGF, though
this probability is higher than that of firms without bank debt (i.e., they don’t appear in the
Central Credit Register) or increases in debt vis-a`-vis current lenders. One interpretation for
this is that expanding firms are more prone to ask for additional financing than stable ones.
Results for other controls suggest that older firms have monotonically decreasing probability
of presenting high growth in employment, with the oldest firms being five times less prone
to reach high growth than the youngest firms. The effect of size is even more intense, with
large firms having 0.20 more probability of experiencing high growth than smallest ones. This
result overturns Gibrat’s Law of Proportionate Effect, which states that firm growth rates are
independent of initial firm size (see Sutton (1997)).
Some of the previous results could be affected by unobserved heterogeneity, in such a way
that good firms have some values of some covariates, and also higher probability of growing.
To control for that, the second column in Table 6 reports the same equation, but controlling
for fixed firm effects. The most important change with respect to the first column is the
auto-regressive effect, which turns into negative values. The interpretation is that the OLS
estimator indeed captures the fact that some firms are more prone to have high growth, but this
effect vanishes once we control for firm-specific fixed effects. Concerning financial conditions,
the main change is that leverage ratio becomes negative, though its magnitude is reduced.
Also, firms with no constraints with their current bank now exhibit a coefficient very close to
the one estimated for firms getting an approval in a new bank. This is more intuitive than
in column one, as now firms not constrained have the highest probability of high growth, no
matter where they find the funds. We thus surmise that asking for additional finance may be
regarded as a good proxy for high growth. Furthermore, it is no longer true that firms with
all new loans rejected have higher probability of high growth than the reference group.
Regarding other covariates, the effect of size is now reversed, with smaller firms having
more probability of high growth. Although these estimates are apparently at odds with the
coefficients on firm size produced by OLS (and Arellano-Bond estimator), both results mu-
tually reinforce each other in explaining employment growth dynamics. That is, conditional
on survival and controlling for firm age, as firms become bigger they find it more difficult to
grow both in absolute and relative terms (focus on within firm variation). However, small
Financial conditions are estimated by using two different set of variables: one is simple long-
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Table 6
HGF in employment (year-sec)(t+1) OLS
Within estimator
(FE)
Arellano-Bond
estimator
(GMM)
HGF in employment (year-sec) 0.0720∗∗∗ −0.1018∗∗∗ 0.0379∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0013)
3-5 years olda −0.0116∗∗∗ −0.0204∗∗∗ −0.0182∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0014)
6-10 years old −0.0247∗∗∗ −0.0210∗∗∗ −0.0406∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0017)
11-15 years old −0.0345∗∗∗ −0.0149∗∗∗ −0.0590∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0021)
16-20 years old −0.0416∗∗∗ −0.0085∗∗∗ −0.0709∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0023) (0.0026)
21 or more years old −0.0553∗∗∗ −0.0080∗∗∗ −0.0885∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0029) (0.0037)
10-19 employeesb 0.0323∗∗∗ −0.0787∗∗∗ 0.0458∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0034)
20-49 employees 0.0845∗∗∗ −0.1676∗∗∗ 0.1201∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0024) (0.0076)
+50 employees 0.1996∗∗∗ −0.2911∗∗∗ 0.2813∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0053) (0.0195)
Credit approved by a new bankc 0.0349∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ 0.0267∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0012)
Not constrained by current bank 0.0217∗∗∗ 0.0167∗∗∗ 0.0242∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0009)
All rejected 0.0071∗∗∗ −0.0067∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0016)
LT debt ratiod 0.0151∗∗∗ −0.0040∗∗ −0.0034
(0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0073)
LT debt ratio2 −0.0056∗∗∗ 0.0012 −0.0031
(0.0022) (0.0011) (0.0053)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year obs. 2 777 366 2 777 366 2 777 366
Number of firms 623 072 623 072
Avg. number of observations per firm 4.458 4.458
R-squared 0.055 0.047
Number of instruments 191
AR(1) test (z) −260.263
p-value 0.000
AR(2) test (z) 1.462
p-value 0.144
Notes: HGFs in employment are defined as top 10% of firms with the highest “Birch-Schreyer index” in the same 2-digit sec-
tor. GMM regressions have been estimated using twostep robust estimation (Windmeijer, 2005). All estimations contain con-
trols for: firm’s wage premium w.r.t firms in the same 2-digit sector, importer/exporter status, and share of permanent work-
ers.Significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
a The base category are firms with 2 or less years old.
b The reference category are firms with 1 – 9 employees.
c The base category are firms of which we have no credit-related information (that is, either they haven’t made credit requests to new banks or they
are not in the CIR database).
d Expressed on a per unit basis.
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Table 7
HGF in productivity (year-sec)(t+1) OLS
Within estimator
(FE)
Arellano-Bond
estimator
(GMM)
HGF in productivity (year-sec) 0.0009 −0.1839∗∗∗ −0.0286∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0010)
3-5 years olda −0.0254∗∗∗ −0.0532∗∗∗ −0.0426∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0015)
6-10 years old −0.0398∗∗∗ −0.0647∗∗∗ −0.0678∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0018)
11-15 years old −0.0458∗∗∗ −0.0600∗∗∗ −0.0825∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0022)
16-20 years old −0.0482∗∗∗ −0.0531∗∗∗ −0.0868∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0022) (0.0028)
21 or more years old −0.0466∗∗∗ −0.0453∗∗∗ −0.0902∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0028) (0.0040)
10-19 employeesb −0.0394∗∗∗ −0.0411∗∗∗ −0.0155∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0026)
20-49 employees −0.0433∗∗∗ −0.0707∗∗∗ −0.0244∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0014) (0.0049)
+50 employees −0.0506∗∗∗ −0.0990∗∗∗ −0.0338∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0027) (0.0095)
Credit approved by a new bankc 0.0100∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0222∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0011)
Not constrained by current bank 0.0087∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0188∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0009)
All rejected −0.0033∗∗∗ −0.0021∗∗ 0.0026∗
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0015)
LT debt ratiod 0.0052 0.0437∗∗∗ 0.1425∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0064)
LT debt ratio2 0.0081∗ 0.0010 −0.0075∗∗∗
(0.0044) (0.0030) (0.0023)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year obs. 2 777 366 2 777 366 2 777 366
Number of firms 623 072 623 072
Avg. number of observations per firm 4.458 4.458
R-squared 0.016 0.047
Number of instruments 191
AR(1) test (z) −285.043
p-value 0.000
AR(2) test (z) 0.771
p-value 0.441
Notes: HGF in productivity are defined as top 10% of fastest growing firms in labor productivity in the same 2-digit sector on
a given year, conditional on its employment having not decreased in the same period. GMM regressions have been estimated
using twostep robust estimation (Windmeijer, 2005). All estimations contain controls for: firm’s wage premium w.r.t firms in
the same 2-digit sector, importer/exporter status, and share of permanent workers. Significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p <
0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
a The base category are firms with 2 or less years old.
b The reference category are firms with 1 – 9 employees.
c The base category are firms of which we have no credit-related information (that is, either they haven’t made credit requests to new banks or they
are not in the CIR database).
d Expressed on a per unit basis.
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firms have a much lower likelihood of surviving and are more volatile. Accordingly, small
firms are underrepresented among HGF in terms of employment (see Panel B of Table 5), and
we observe that larger firms are more likely to experience high growth when the focus is on
cross-sectional variation (i.e., OLS and Arellano-Bond estimator).
Fixed effects estimators can be biased if present or past high growth affects future co-
variates. This seems to be the case, as the third column in Table 6 shows. Size and the
auto-regressive component now return to positive (albeit the second one is still one half lower
than in OLS), suggesting that for these two variables, the biases corrected by fixed effects
and Arellano-Bond estimators are opposite, and partially cancel out with each other. On the
other hand, leverage becomes non-significant and the variables related to access to new credit
are not qualitatively affected, with the exception of the coefficient on firms with all new loans
rejected, which becomes positive. The fact that firms with all new loans rejected have higher
probability than the reference groups implicitly implies that some of those firms, despite hav-
ing asked for new loans and got all rejected, managed to grow at the end, so they didn’t really
need the extra financing, and found other ways of funding their growth.
Overall, the comparison between columns two and three reveals the well-known negative
bias introduced by FE in dynamic panel models (Flannery and Hankins, 2013). In summary,
using then our preferred estimation (Arellano-Bond), high growth in employment has some
degree of persistence, is negatively affected by age, and positively affected by size and access
to new finance. Leverage structure seems to be unrelated to high growth, and firms asking
for new finance still have a positive effect on high employment growth, even if they get only
rejections.
Now, going into high growth in productivity, first column in Table 7 shows that, according
to OLS estimates, there is no persistence. Access to new finance has the same ranking as before
(first firms asking and getting new loans from new banks, followed by firms not constrained
in their current bank, then firms in the reference category, and finally firms asking for new
finance, but getting only rejections), however the effects are smaller. Leverage effect, on
the other hand, turns non-significant, though the picture changes when we introduce firm
fixed effects and control for feedback effects with Arellano-Bond estimator. Finally, for high
productivity growth, both age and size have negative effects.
Adding fixed effects does not introduce many changes, with the exception of the auto-
regressive component, which becomes strongly negative, and the coefficient on the long term
debt ratio, which turns positive and significant. Taking into account possible feedback from
high productivity growth in covariates, as the third column in Table 7 shows, poses some
more changes. First, the auto-regressive coefficient is also negative, but its size is substantially
reduced in comparison with the fixed effects estimator. Consistent with Coad and Broekel
(2012), this finding implies that firms that experienced high growth in productivity one year
are unlikely to repeat such behavior the next year. Second, access to new finance is not
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Table 8
HGF in employment (year-sec)(t+1) OLS
Within estimator
(FE)
Arellano-Bond
estimator
(GMM)
HGF in employment (year-sec) 0.0720∗∗∗ −0.1018∗∗∗ 0.0376∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0013)
HGF in productivity (year-sec) 0.0217∗∗∗ 0.0176∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009)
3-5 years olda −0.0087∗∗∗ −0.0183∗∗∗ −0.0154∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0014)
6-10 years old −0.0211∗∗∗ −0.0186∗∗∗ −0.0370∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0017)
11-15 years old −0.0306∗∗∗ −0.0126∗∗∗ −0.0553∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0021)
16-20 years old −0.0377∗∗∗ −0.0065∗∗∗ −0.0672∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0023) (0.0026)
21 or more years old −0.0513∗∗∗ −0.0062∗∗ −0.0850∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0029) (0.0037)
10-19 employeesb 0.0332∗∗∗ −0.0787∗∗∗ 0.0447∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0034)
20-49 employees 0.0855∗∗∗ −0.1677∗∗∗ 0.1180∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0024) (0.0076)
+50 employees 0.2008∗∗∗ −0.2914∗∗∗ 0.2780∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0053) (0.0195)
Credit approved by a new bankc 0.0347∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0266∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0012)
Not constrained by current bank 0.0217∗∗∗ 0.0166∗∗∗ 0.0243∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0009)
All rejected 0.0072∗∗∗ −0.0067∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0016)
LT debt ratiod 0.0148∗∗∗ −0.0043∗∗ −0.0037
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0071)
LT debt ratio2 −0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0012 −0.0027
(0.0022) (0.0011) (0.0050)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year obs. 2 777 366 2 777 366 2 777 366
Number of firms 623 072 623 072
Avg. number of observations per firm 4.458 4.458
R-squared 0.056 0.047
Number of instruments 201
AR(1) test (z) −260.291
p-value 0.000
AR(2) test (z) 1.349
p-value 0.177
Notes: HGFs in employment are defined as top 10% of firms with the highest “Birch-Schreyer index” in the same 2-digit sec-
tor. HGF in productivity are defined as top 10% of fastest growing firms in labor productivity in the same 2-digit sector on
a given year, conditional on its employment having not decreased in the same period. GMM regressions have been estimated
using twostep robust estimation (Windmeijer, 2005). All estimations contain controls for: firm’s wage premium w.r.t firms in
the same 2-digit sector, importer/exporter status, and share of permanent workers. Significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p <
0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
a The base category are firms with 2 or less years old.
b The reference category are firms with 1 – 9 employees.
c The base category are firms of which we have no credit-related information (that is, either they haven’t made credit requests to new banks or they
are not in the CIR database).
d Expressed on a per unit basis.
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Table 9
HGF in productivity (year-sec)(t+1) OLS
Within estimator
(FE)
Arellano-Bond
estimator
(GMM)
HGF in productivity (year-sec) 0.0009 −0.1839∗∗∗ −0.0285∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0010)
HGF in employment (year-sec) −0.0018∗∗∗ −0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0105∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009)
3-5 years olda −0.0256∗∗∗ −0.0535∗∗∗ −0.0410∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0016)
6-10 years old −0.0401∗∗∗ −0.0650∗∗∗ −0.0657∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0019)
11-15 years old −0.0461∗∗∗ −0.0603∗∗∗ −0.0804∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0022)
16-20 years old −0.0485∗∗∗ −0.0534∗∗∗ −0.0847∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0022) (0.0028)
21 or more years old −0.0469∗∗∗ −0.0455∗∗∗ −0.0886∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0028) (0.0040)
10-19 employeesb −0.0392∗∗∗ −0.0407∗∗∗ −0.0200∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0025)
20-49 employees −0.0429∗∗∗ −0.0698∗∗∗ −0.0351∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0048)
+50 employees −0.0500∗∗∗ −0.0974∗∗∗ −0.0535∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0028) (0.0094)
Credit approved by a new bankc 0.0101∗∗∗ 0.0132∗∗∗ 0.0220∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0011)
Not constrained by current bank 0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0114∗∗∗ 0.0187∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0009)
All rejected −0.0033∗∗∗ −0.0021∗∗ 0.0026∗
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0015)
LT debt ratiod 0.0052 0.0437∗∗∗ 0.1418∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0065)
LT debt ratio2 0.0081∗ 0.0010 −0.0074∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0030) (0.0026)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year obs. 2 777 366 2 777 366 2 777 366
Number of firms 623 072 623 072
Avg. number of observations per firm 4.458 4.458
R-squared 0.016 0.047
Number of instruments 201
AR(1) test (z) −285.004
p-value 0.000
AR(2) test (z) 0.682
p-value 0.495
Notes: HGFs in employment are defined as top 10% of firms with the highest “Birch-Schreyer index” in the same 2-digit sec-
tor. HGF in productivity are defined as top 10% of fastest growing firms in labor productivity in the same 2-digit sector on
a given year, conditional on its employment having not decreased in the same period. GMM regressions have been estimated
using twostep robust estimation (Windmeijer, 2005). All estimations contain controls for: firm’s wage premium w.r.t firms in
the same 2-digit sector, importer/exporter status, and share of permanent workers. Significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p <
0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
a The base category are firms with 2 or less years old.
b The reference category are firms with 1 – 9 employees.
c The base category are firms of which we have no credit-related information (that is, either they haven’t made credit requests to new banks or they
are not in the CIR database).
d Expressed on a per unit basis.
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Table 10
HGF in employment
year-sec(t+1)
HGF in productivity
year-sec(t+1)
HGF in employment (year-sec) 0.0386∗∗∗ 0.0382∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0009)
HGF in productivity (year-sec) 0.0152∗∗∗ −0.0284∗∗∗ −0.0283∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010)
3-5 years olda −0.0191∗∗∗ −0.0163∗∗∗ −0.0434∗∗∗ −0.0417∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0016)
6-10 years old −0.0427∗∗∗ −0.0391∗∗∗ −0.0695∗∗∗ −0.0674∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0019)
11-15 years old −0.0628∗∗∗ −0.0590∗∗∗ −0.0857∗∗∗ −0.0835∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022)
16-20 years old −0.0763∗∗∗ −0.0727∗∗∗ −0.0916∗∗∗ −0.0894∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0028)
21 or more years old −0.0967∗∗∗ −0.0932∗∗∗ −0.0972∗∗∗ −0.0955∗∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0040)
10-19 employeesb 0.0466∗∗∗ 0.0456∗∗∗ −0.0145∗∗∗ −0.0193∗∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0026) (0.0025)
20-49 employees 0.1215∗∗∗ 0.1195∗∗∗ −0.0227∗∗∗ −0.0340∗∗∗
(0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0049) (0.0048)
+50 employees 0.2830∗∗∗ 0.2797∗∗∗ −0.0314∗∗∗ −0.0521∗∗∗
(0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0096) (0.0094)
LT debt ratioc 0.0290∗∗∗ 0.0286∗∗∗ 0.1663∗∗∗ 0.1654∗∗∗
(0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0064) (0.0064)
LT debt ratio2 −0.0119 −0.0114 −0.0091∗∗∗ −0.0091∗∗∗
(0.0083) (0.0081) (0.0009) (0.0010)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year obs. 2 777 366 2 777 366 2 777 366 2 777 366
Number of firms 623 072 623 072 623 072 623 072
Avg. number of observations per firm 4.458 4.458 4.458 4.458
Number of instruments 161 171 161 171
AR(1) test (z) −260.081 −260.112 −285.024 −284.983
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test (z) 1.544 1.431 0.777 0.685
p-value 0.123 0.152 0.437 0.493
Notes: HGFs in employment are defined as top 10% of firms with the highest “Birch-Schreyer index” in the same 2-digit sec-
tor. HGF in productivity are defined as top 10% of fastest growing firms in labor productivity in the same 2-digit sector on
a given year, conditional on its employment having not decreased in the same period. GMM regressions have been estimated
using twostep robust estimation (Windmeijer, 2005). All estimations contain controls for: firm’s wage premium w.r.t firms in
the same 2-digit sector, importer/exporter status, and share of permanent workers. Significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p <
0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
a The base category are firms with 2 or less years old.
b The reference category are firms with 1 – 9 employees.
c The base category are firms of which we have no credit-related information (that is, either they haven’t made credit requests to new banks or they
are not in the CIR database).
d Expressed on a per unit basis.
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qualitatively affected, but the coefficients are around twice as large as in the cases of OLS
or fixed effects. And third, the leverage ratio becomes strongly positive, with a virtually
nonexistent U-shape pattern. In conclusion, as opposed to employment, high productivity
growth is negatively auto-correlated, depends negatively on age and size, and positively on
leverage and access to new credit.
So far, we have studied each type of high growth separately. Tables 8 and 9 extend
the previous models to allow cross auto-correlation between high growth in employment and
productivity. The first thing to notice is that all other coefficients are hardly affected; hence the
omission of crossed effects did not affect their estimation. Focusing now on cross correlation
coefficients, it’s clear that high productivity growth has a positive effect on the probability
of future high employment growth. We find this positive effect on all the three estimation
methods considered. On the contrary, crossed effect from high growth in employment on
productivity is less clear. It is negative for the OLS and FE estimators, but positive for the
Arellano-Bond one. Even in this latter case, the magnitude is 0.01, which is around one third
lower than the effect of productivity on employment for the same method. These results are
in line with those in Moral-Benito (2016).
Finally, we want to stress the importance of omitted variables bias in the estimation of
financial factors. Some papers (e.g. Lopez-Garcia and Puente, 2012) have estimated the effect
of leverage on high growth. However, this estimation could be biased if the important issue
for high growth is to have access to new credit, not leverage by itself. If access facilitates an
increase in leverage (a sensible possibility), then omitting access to credit could substantially
bias up the estimated effect of leverage. Table 10 presents Arellano-Bond estimators for both
types of high growth, but excluding variables related to access to new credit. The result
is that all coefficients are more or less unaffected, except the leverage ones. In the case of
high employment growth, leverage estimators turn positive and significant, moreover they
are 7-8 times larger in absolute value. For high productivity growth, changes are not that
intense: the relation is still positive and quadratic, though coefficients on both the linear
and quadratic terms are larger. These results point to a warning when estimating effects of
financial structure, as estimators could suffer from an important bias if variables related to
access to new credit are not taken into account.
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7 Conclusions
This paper adds to a wide range of recent research in entrepreneurship, innovation, and firm
demography devoted to understanding what characterizes high growth firms (Almus, 2002;
Lopez-Garcia and Puente, 2012; Segarra and Teruel, 2014). Our analysis extends this literature
by providing evidence on the role of financial constraints as a growth barrier,29 and by exploring
the potential feedback effects from productivity growth to size growth, and vice versa.
According to our results, being a HGF in productivity significantly increases the probability
of experiencing subsequent high growth in employment. Similarly, employment HGF status
leads to higher probability of becoming a HGF in productivity in the following period, however,
the magnitude of this crossed effect is around one third of that of productivity on employment
high growth. Our interpretation of this finding is that while barriers to firm growth might be
important (e.g. size-dependent regulations) the key determinant of firm growth is productivity,
as predicted by standard models of firm dynamics (Jovanovic, 1982).
As for the role of financial constraints, our findings indicate that, regardless of whom
provides the funds (whether current lenders or new ones), firms getting a loan approval have
significantly more probability of experiencing high growth of any kind than firms without bank
debt increases or with no bank debt at all. We thus conclude that credit constraints hamper
high growth episodes in terms of size and productivity.
While we acknowledge there are other potential factors affecting firm’s growth and produc-
tivity prospects that are absent in our analysis (e.g., innovation and R&D intensity, managerial
talent, market competition), the purpose of this paper is to emphasize the role of financial
constraints as determinants of size and productivity high growth, as well as to open the door
to future research on the firm size–productivity nexus. One potential avenue for future re-
search could be to explore the importance of the high growth phenomenon at the aggregate
level, by taking into account firm entry and exit rates together with the underlying resource
reallocation process.
29In this regard, our paper also contributes to the literature on the effects of financial constraints on firms’
real outcomes (Campello et al., 2010; Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Popov and Rocholl, 2016).
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A Other Tables and figures
Table A.1: Contribution to employment (L) growth*
Number of firms in each group Absolute growth in number of employees
All sectors HGF in L L grows L shrinks All Firms HGF in L L grows L shrinks All Firms
2001 - 2002 18,452 119,074 43,922 181,448 164,374.9 51,006.4 - 125,583.6 89,797.7
2002 - 2003 21,313 135,723 53,063 210,099 180,736.1 54,107.3 - 151,215.9 83,627.6
2003 - 2004 23,811 149,694 61,538 235,043 222,810.2 59,086.8 - 162,090.2 119,806.8
2004 - 2005 25,388 162,664 65,978 254,030 245,697.5 68,289.1 - 159,184.1 154,802.6
2005 - 2006 25,180 159,890 69,359 254,429 240,449.4 66,660.5 - 152,351.0 154,758.8
2006 - 2007 24,628 149,930 69,774 244,332 235,965.5 59,971.0 - 160,435.4 135,501.2
2007 - 2008 26,067 133,708 92,331 252,106 221,039.0 47,066.0 - 259,281.9 8,823.1
2008 - 2009 30,673 135,531 130,973 297,177 147,898.7 22,489.5 - 431,820.9 - 261,432.7
2009 - 2010 30,575 149,977 116,868 297,420 222,359.0 35,536.4 - 277,475.4 - 19,580.0
2010 - 2011 30,096 156,041 105,996 292,133 191,958.9 37,517.6 - 253,372.1 - 23,895.6
2011 - 2012 26,542 128,878 103,729 259,149 154,882.5 24,112.8 - 268,096.2 - 89,100.9
Total 282,725 1,581,110 913,531 2,777,366 2,228,171.7 525,843.5 - 2,400,906.7 353,108.6
* Figures in the table are computed as follows. Each year (t) firms are classified into one of the following groups: HGF in employment
(top 10% of firms with the highest “Birch-Schreyer index” in the same 2-digit sector), slow growth firms (firms that don’t qualify as HGF
but that either kept their employment constant or increased it), and shrinking firms (firms that don’t qualify as HGF but that decreased
their employment). We then compute firms’ absolute change in the number of employees from t − 1 to t, and sum it all up across firms
within the same group.
DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 171854BANCO DE ESPAÑA
Table A.2: Contribution to labor productivity (LPR)
Number of firms in each group
How much aggregate productivity would have
grown, had the reference group not grown Contribution of each group to aggregate growtha
All sectors
HGF in
LPR
LPR
grows
LPR
shrinks All Firms HGF
LPR
grows
LPR
shrinks All Firms HGF
LPR
grows
LPR
shrinks All Firms
2001 - 2002 17,739 70,084 93,625 181,448 −3.1% −6.5% 6.0% −1.7% 1.4pp 4.8pp −7.7pp −1.7%
2002 - 2003 20,801 86,807 102,491 210,099 −1.5% −5.3% 7.4% 0.3% 1.7pp 5.5pp −7.2pp 0.3%
2003 - 2004 23,182 93,391 118,470 235,043 −1.7% −5.5% 7.4% 0.0% 1.8pp 5.6pp −7.3pp 0.0%
2004 - 2005 24,971 102,298 126,761 254,030 −4.0% −7.1% 6.2% −2.1% 1.9pp 5.0pp −8.3pp −2.1%
2005 - 2006 24,992 109,992 119,445 254,429 −1.6% −5.1% 7.8% 0.6% 2.1pp 5.7pp −7.3pp 0.6%
2006 - 2007 24,001 109,175 111,156 244,332 −0.4% −4.9% 8.3% 1.3% 1.7pp 6.2pp −6.9pp 1.3%
2007 - 2008 25,225 82,781 144,100 252,106 −7.0% −9.6% 6.1% −5.8% 1.2pp 3.9pp −11.9pp −5.8%
2008 - 2009 29,280 99,006 168,891 297,177 −4.4% −7.1% 7.6% −2.9% 1.5pp 4.2pp −10.4pp −2.9%
2009 - 2010 29,734 123,466 144,220 297,420 2.0% −4.5% 10.2% 3.7% 1.7pp 8.2pp −6.6pp 3.7%
2010 - 2011 28,942 105,544 157,647 292,133 −2.8% −6.3% 7.3% −1.2% 1.6pp 5.1pp −8.5pp −1.2%
2011 - 2012 25,889 91,569 141,691 259,149 −2.4% −6.1% 7.1% −1.1% 1.4pp 5.0pp −8.2pp −1.1%
Total 274,756 1,074,113 1,428,497 2,777,366 −2.4% −6.2% 7.5% −0.8%
a The contribution of the different reference groups (i.e., HGF, slow growth firms and shrinking firms) to overall labor productivity growth is computed as follows. First we calculate the
growth in productivity for all studied firms had the reference group not grown. We do this by setting the labor productivity growth of the reference group to zero; in particular, we set the
deflated GVA to a level such that GVA per employee from t− 1 to t remains unchanged. Then we compute the growth rate in labor productivity from t− 1 to t as:
Labor productivity growth t (%) =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
n∑
i=1
GV Ai,t
n∑
i=1
Li,t
/ n∑
i=1
GV Ai,t−1
n∑
i=1
Li,t−1
− 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠× 100
Secondly, we define the contribution of each group to overall growth as the difference between overall (actual) growth for all studied firms and the rate of growth for all studied firms had the
reference firms’ not grown.
DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 171855BANCO DE ESPAÑA
Table B.1: Summary statistics by HGF status
HGF in productivity HGF in employment
Total
0 1 0 1
Avg. no employees Mean 16.70 7.67 11.29 55.58 15.80
10th percentile 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Median 4.83 3.00 4.00 10.00 4.47
90th percentile 21.00 12.00 17.00 50.00 20.00
Standard deviation 283.25 92.45 181.64 652.37 270.44
Firm age Mean 12.01 9.41 11.85 10.93 11.75
10th percentile 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00
Median 11.00 8.00 10.00 9.00 10.00
90th percentile 22.00 19.00 21.00 22.00 21.00
Standard deviation 8.66 8.15 8.52 9.66 8.64
Total assets Mean 3,061.27 1,609.76 2,220.54 9,067.15 2,917.50
10th percentile 57.66 45.18 53.66 94.04 56.07
Median 336.39 244.74 306.42 584.96 325.94
90th percentile 2,425.20 1,905.48 2,160.67 5,347.89 2,376.20
Standard deviation 104,405.30 36,640.55 88,810.84 167,770.20 99,769.62
Total sales Mean 2,741.36 1,418.48 1,929.83 8,614.74 2,610.33
10th percentile 65.73 54.94 60.66 139.61 64.31
Median 364.28 265.76 324.68 791.24 352.60
90th percentile 2,497.85 1,747.57 2,114.90 5,696.13 2,427.78
Standard deviation 80,081.52 33,747.74 66,977.54 135,078.80 76,751.68
LT debt ratio Mean 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17
10th percentile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Median 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.06
90th percentile 0.51 0.57 0.52 0.51 0.52
Standard deviation 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.23
B Extended Summary Statistics
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(continuation Table B.1)
HGF in productivity HGF in employment
Total
0 1 0 1
Wage premium (within sector) Mean 1.02 0.99 1.02 0.96 1.01
10th percentile 0.56 0.51 0.56 0.54 0.55
Median 0.95 0.91 0.95 0.91 0.94
90th percentile 1.55 1.58 1.57 1.43 1.56
Standard deviation 0.42 0.45 0.43 0.37 0.42
Share of permanent workers Mean 0.81 0.81 0.83 0.69 0.81
10th percentile 0.43 0.38 0.47 0.25 0.43
Median 0.94 1.00 0.98 0.75 0.95
90th percentile 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Standard deviation 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.26
Firm exports No of cases 114,499 11,546 102,080 23,965 126,045
Relative Frequency 90.8% 9.2% 81.0% 19.0% 100.0%
Firm imports No of cases 153,830 15,498 138,628 30,700 169,328
Relative Frequency 90.8% 9.2% 81.9% 18.1% 100.0%
Firm-year observations in sample 2,502,278 275,088 2,494,641 282,725 2,777,366
90.10% 9.90% 89.82% 10.18% 100.00%
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Table B.2: Summary statistics by degree of financial constraints
No info
Credit
approved
by a new
bank
Not
constrained
by current
bank All rejected Total
Avg. no employees Mean 9.10 24.33 20.78 24.57 15.80
10th percentile 1.00 2.00 1.68 1.25 1.00
Median 3.34 6.95 5.66 5.42 4.47
90th percentile 13.39 31.75 24.00 26.85 20.00
Standard deviation 163.84 308.66 341.58 388.52 270.44
Firm age Mean 11.43 11.83 12.04 12.74 11.75
10th percentile 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
Median 10.00 10.00 10.00 11.00 10.00
90th percentile 21.00 22.00 22.00 23.00 21.00
Standard deviation 8.23 9.08 8.95 9.15 8.64
Total assets (K euros) Mean 1,716.98 3,883.78 3,957.60 4,684.87 2,917.50
10th percentile 38.65 105.55 86.25 78.86 56.07
Median 216.84 601.02 422.75 533.15 325.94
90th percentile 1,573.79 3,987.22 2,773.50 3,838.18 2,376.20
Standard deviation 87,547.02 87,085.62 114,973.60 115,053.30 99,769.62
Total sales (K euros) Mean 1,269.06 3,760.66 3,823.53 3,910.12 2,610.33
10th percentile 45.66 118.10 102.52 79.63 64.31
Median 225.77 684.07 503.40 485.72 352.60
90th percentile 1,341.78 4,337.50 3,051.98 3,426.94 2,427.78
Standard deviation 51,722.31 79,230.16 96,317.04 105,836.90 76,751.68
LT debt ratio Mean 0.15 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.17
10th percentile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Median 0.02 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.06
90th percentile 0.50 0.54 0.51 0.55 0.52
Standard deviation 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.23
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(continuation Table B.2)
No info
Credit
approved
by a new
bank
Not
constrained
by current
bank All rejected Total
Wage premium (within sector) Mean 0.97 1.05 1.05 1.03 1.01
10th percentile 0.51 0.61 0.60 0.58 0.55
Median 0.90 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.94
90th percentile 1.52 1.56 1.60 1.56 1.56
Standard deviation 0.43 0.40 0.42 0.41 0.42
Share of permanent workers Mean 0.83 0.78 0.80 0.81 0.81
10th percentile 0.47 0.36 0.40 0.43 0.43
Median 1.00 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.95
90th percentile 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Standard deviation 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.26
Firm exports goods No of cases 28,665 25,620 65,330 6,430 126,045
Relative Frequency 22.7% 20.3% 51.8% 5.1% 100.0%
Firm imports goods No of cases 38,550 34,704 88,265 7,809 169,328
Relative Frequency 22.8% 20.5% 52.1% 4.6% 100.0%
HGF in productivity = 1 No of cases 134,247 32,436 98,277 10,128 275,088
Relative Frequency 48.8% 11.8% 35.7% 3.7% 100.0%
HGF in employment = 1 No of cases 97,533 51,498 121,311 12,383 282,725
Relative Frequency 34.5% 18.2% 42.9% 4.4% 100.0%
Firm-year observations in sample 1,315,116 313,911 1,036,805 111,534 2,777,366
47.4% 11.3% 37.3% 4.0% 100.0%
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C Robustness Checks
Table C.1: Marginal effects: RE probit vs FE
HGF in employment (year-sec) (t+1)
RE probit
model Fixed effects
RE probit
model Fixed effects
HGF in employment (year-sec) 0.0666∗∗∗ −0.1018∗∗∗ 0.0662∗∗∗ −0.1018∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
HGF in productivity (year-sec) 0.0164∗∗∗ 0.0176∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0006)
3-5 years olda −0.0145∗∗∗ −0.0204∗∗∗ −0.0126∗∗∗ −0.0183∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0011)
6-10 years old −0.0310∗∗∗ −0.0210∗∗∗ −0.0287∗∗∗ −0.0186∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0014)
11-15 years old −0.0462∗∗∗ −0.0149∗∗∗ −0.0440∗∗∗ −0.0126∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0010) (0.0018)
16-20 years old −0.0580∗∗∗ −0.0085∗∗∗ −0.0562∗∗∗ −0.0065∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0023) (0.0011) (0.0023)
21 or more years old −0.0719∗∗∗ −0.0080∗∗∗ −0.0705∗∗∗ −0.0062∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0029) (0.0011) (0.0029)
10-19 employeesb −0.0681∗∗∗ −0.0787∗∗∗ −0.0681∗∗∗ −0.0787∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0012)
20-49 employees −0.0939∗∗∗ −0.1676∗∗∗ −0.0940∗∗∗ −0.1677∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0024) (0.0005) (0.0024)
+50 employees −0.0923∗∗∗ −0.2911∗∗∗ −0.0923∗∗∗ −0.2914∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0053) (0.0003) (0.0053)
Credit approved by a new bankc 0.0130∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Not constrained by current bank 0.0170∗∗∗ 0.0167∗∗∗ 0.0170∗∗∗ 0.0166∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
All rejected −0.0061∗∗∗ −0.0067∗∗∗ −0.0061∗∗∗ −0.0067∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010)
LT debt ratiod −0.0003 −0.0036∗∗ −0.0004 −0.0039∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0017)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year obs. 2,777,366 2,777,366 2,777,366 2,777,366
Number of firms 623,072 623,072 623,072 623,072
Avg. no observations per firm 4.458 4.458 4.458 4.458
R-squared 0.047 0.047
Rho 0.021 0.022
Sigma u 0.148 0.149
Notes: We apply Wooldridge (2005) solution to the initial conditions problem for dynamic nonlinear unobserved-effects models.
In doing so, we include the within-means of time-varying regressors as additional explanatory variables. Several authors have
forewarned that this methodology performs poorly for short panels if the within-means are based on all periods, including the
initial period. However, following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013), we overcome this problem by including the initial-period
explanatory variables as additional regressors. HGF in employment are defined as top 5% of firms with the highest “Birch-Schreyer
index” in the same 2-digit sector. All estimations contain controls for: firm’s wage premium w.r.t other firms in the same 2-digit
sector (in logs), importer/exporter status, and share of permanent workers.
a The base category are firms with 2 or less years old.
b The reference category are firms with 1 – 9 employees.
c The base category are firms of which we have no credit-related information (that is, either they haven’t made credit requests to
new banks or they are not in the CIR database).
d Expressed on a per unit basis.
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Table C.2: Marginal effects: RE probit vs FE
HGF in productivity (year-sec) (t+1)
RE probit
model Fixed effects
RE probit
model Fixed effects
HGF in productivity (year-sec) −0.0182∗∗∗ −0.1839∗∗∗ −0.0182∗∗∗ −0.1839∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0007)
HGF in employment (year-sec) −0.0030∗∗∗ −0.0030∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0006)
3-5 years olda −0.0271∗∗∗ −0.0532∗∗∗ −0.0275∗∗∗ −0.0535∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0011)
6-10 years old −0.0408∗∗∗ −0.0647∗∗∗ −0.0416∗∗∗ −0.0650∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0014)
11-15 years old −0.0447∗∗∗ −0.0600∗∗∗ −0.0456∗∗∗ −0.0603∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0010) (0.0018)
16-20 years old −0.0456∗∗∗ −0.0531∗∗∗ −0.0467∗∗∗ −0.0534∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0022) (0.0011) (0.0022)
21 or more years old −0.0475∗∗∗ −0.0453∗∗∗ −0.0486∗∗∗ −0.0455∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0028) (0.0014) (0.0028)
10-19 employeesb −0.0431∗∗∗ −0.0411∗∗∗ −0.0426∗∗∗ −0.0407∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009)
20-49 employees −0.0671∗∗∗ −0.0707∗∗∗ −0.0664∗∗∗ −0.0698∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0015)
+50 employees −0.0784∗∗∗ −0.0990∗∗∗ −0.0779∗∗∗ −0.0974∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0027) (0.0009) (0.0028)
Credit approved by a new bankc 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0136∗∗∗ 0.0132∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Not constrained by current bank 0.0130∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0114∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
All rejected −0.0041∗∗∗ −0.0021∗∗ −0.0041∗∗∗ −0.0021∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
LT debt ratiod 0.0407∗∗∗ 0.0441∗∗∗ 0.0407∗∗∗ 0.0441∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0022) (0.0015) (0.0022)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year obs. 2,777,366 2,777,366 2,777,366 2,777,366
Number of firms 623,072 623,072 623,072 623,072
Avg. no observations per firm 4.458 4.458 4.458 4.458
R-squared 0.047 0.047
Rho 0.087 0.086
Sigma u 0.309 0.307
Notes: We apply Wooldridge (2005) solution to the initial conditions problem for dynamic nonlinear unobserved-effects models.
In doing so, we include the within-means of time-varying regressors as additional explanatory variables. Several authors have
forewarned that this methodology performs poorly for short panels if the within-means are based on all periods, including the
initial period. However, following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013), we overcome this problem by including the initial-period
explanatory variables as additional regressors. HGF in employment are defined as top 5% of firms with the highest “Birch-Schreyer
index” in the same 2-digit sector. All estimations contain controls for: firm’s wage premium w.r.t other firms in the same 2-digit
sector (in logs), importer/exporter status, and share of permanent workers.
a The base category are firms with 2 or less years old.
b The reference category are firms with 1 – 9 employees.
c The base category are firms of which we have no credit-related information (that is, either they haven’t made credit requests to
new banks or they are not in the CIR database).
d Expressed on a per unit basis.
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Table C.3: Top 1% HGF (equivalent to Table 6)
HGF in employment (year-sec) (t+1) OLS
Within estimator
(FE)
Arellano-Bond
estimator
(GMM)
HGF in employment (year-sec) 0.1010∗∗∗ −0.1107∗∗∗ 0.0337∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0028)
3-5 years olda 0.0006∗∗ −0.0025∗∗∗ −0.0015∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
6-10 years old −0.0008∗∗∗ −0.0014∗∗∗ −0.0034∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0005)
11-15 years old −0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0005 −0.0054∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006)
16-20 years old −0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗ −0.0067∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0007)
21 or more years old −0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗ −0.0098∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0010)
10-19 employeesb 0.0014∗∗∗ −0.0106∗∗∗ 0.0082∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0011)
20-49 employees 0.0103∗∗∗ −0.0287∗∗∗ 0.0213∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0029)
+50 employees 0.0857∗∗∗ −0.0696∗∗∗ 0.0755∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0103)
Credit approved by a new bankc 0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Not constrained by current bank 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
All rejected 0.0001 −0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005)
LT debt ratiod 0.0010∗∗∗ −0.0004 −0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0015)
LT debt ratio2 −0.0001 0.0003 −0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year obs. 2,777,366 2,777,366 2,777,366
Number of firms 623,072 623,072 623,072
Avg. no observations per firm 4.458 4.458
R-squared 0.051 0.022
Number of instruments 191
AB test for autocorrelation of order 1 (z) −82.113
Prob > z 0.000
AB test for autocorrelation of order 2 (z) 0.351
Prob > z 0.726
Notes: HGF in employment are defined as top 5% of firms with the highest “Birch-Schreyer index” in the same 2-digit sector.
GMM regressions have been estimated using twostep robust estimator (Windmeijer, 2005). All estimations contain controls for:
firm’s wage premium w.r.t other firms in the same 2-digit sector (in logs), importer/exporter status, and share of permanent
workers.
a The base category are firms with 2 or less years old.
b The reference category are firms with 1 – 9 employees.
c The base category are firms of which we have no credit-related information (that is, either they haven’t made credit requests to
new banks or they are not in the CIR database).
d Expressed on a per unit basis.
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Table C.4: Top 1% HGF (equivalent to Table 7)
HGF in productivity (year-sec) (t+1) OLS
Within estimator
(FE)
Arellano-Bond
estimator
(GMM)
HGF in productivity (year-sec) −0.0009 −0.1614∗∗∗ −0.0127∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0013)
3-5 years olda −0.0022∗∗∗ −0.0068∗∗∗ −0.0037∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005)
6-10 years old −0.0035∗∗∗ −0.0073∗∗∗ −0.0047∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006)
11-15 years old −0.0039∗∗∗ −0.0061∗∗∗ −0.0040∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0007)
16-20 years old −0.0037∗∗∗ −0.0050∗∗∗ −0.0018∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0008)
21 or more years old −0.0033∗∗∗ −0.0046∗∗∗ −0.0007
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0012)
10-19 employeesb −0.0051∗∗∗ −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.0017∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0006)
20-49 employees −0.0055∗∗∗ −0.0069∗∗∗ −0.0022∗
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0012)
+50 employees −0.0053∗∗∗ −0.0091∗∗∗ −0.0030
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0021)
Credit approved by new bankc 0.0004∗∗ 0.0003∗ 0.0018∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Not constrained by current bank 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0002∗ 0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
All rejected −0.0001 −0.0010∗∗∗ −0.0007∗
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005)
LT debt ratiod 0.0014∗ 0.0059∗∗∗ 0.0185∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0023)
LT debt ratio2 0.0018∗ 0.0008 −0.0004
(0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0017)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year obs. 2,777,366 2,777,366 2,777,366
Number of firms 623,072 623,072 623,072
Avg. n observations per firm 4.458 4.458
R-squared 0.003 0.035
N of instruments used 191
AR(1) (p-value) −87.311
Prob > z 0.000
AR(2) (p-value) 1.926
Prob > z 0.054
Notes: HGF in productivity are the top 5% of fastest growing firms in labor productivity in the same 2-digit sector on a given
year, conditional on its employment having not decreased in the same period. GMM regressions have been estimated using
twostep robust estimator (Windmeijer, 2005). All estimations contain controls for: firm’s wage premium w.r.t other firms in the
same 2-digit sector (in logs), importer/exporter status, and share of permanent workers.
a The base category are firms with 2 or less years old.
b The reference category are firms with 1 – 9 employees.
c The base category are firms of which we have no credit-related information (that is, either they haven’t made credit requests to
new banks or they are not in the CIR database).
d Expressed on a per unit basis.
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Table C.5: Top 1% HGF (equivalent to Table 8)
HGF in employment (year-sec)(t+1) OLS
Within estimator
(FE)
Arellano-Bond
estimator
(GMM)
HGF in employment (year-sec) 0.1009∗∗∗ −0.1107∗∗∗ 0.0336∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0028)
HGF in productivity (year-sec) 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0009)
3-5 years olda 0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0024∗∗∗ −0.0013∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
6-10 years old −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0013∗∗∗ −0.0033∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0005)
11-15 years old −0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0006 −0.0052∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006)
16-20 years old −0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗ −0.0065∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0007)
21 or more years old −0.0038∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0096∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0010)
10-19 employeesb 0.0014∗∗∗ −0.0106∗∗∗ 0.0082∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0011)
20-49 employees 0.0103∗∗∗ −0.0287∗∗∗ 0.0212∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0029)
+50 employees 0.0857∗∗∗ −0.0696∗∗∗ 0.0753∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0103)
Credit approved by new bankc 0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Not constrained by current bank 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
All rejected 0.0001 −0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005)
LT debt ratiod 0.0010∗∗∗ −0.0004 −0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0015)
LT debt ratio2 −0.0001 0.0003 −0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year obs. 2,777,366 2,777,366 2,777,366
Number of firms 623,072 623,072 623,072
Avg. n observations per firm 4.458 4.458
R-squared 0.051 0.022
N of instruments used 201
AR(1) (p-value) −82.100
Prob > z 0.000
AR(2) (p-value) 0.340
Prob > z 0.734
Notes: HGF in employment are defined as top 5% of firms with the highest “Birch-Schreyer index” in the same 2-digit sector.
GMM regressions have been estimated using twostep robust estimator (Windmeijer, 2005). All estimations contain controls for:
firm’s wage premium w.r.t other firms in the same 2-digit sector (in logs), importer/exporter status, and share of permanent
workers.
a The base category are firms with 2 or less years old.
b The reference category are firms with 1 – 9 employees.
c The base category are firms of which we have no credit-related information (that is, either they haven’t made credit requests to
new banks or they are not in the CIR database).
d Expressed on a per unit basis. 59
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Table C.6: Top 1% HGF (equivalent to Table 9)
HGF in productivity (year-sec) OLS
Within estimator
(FE)
Arellano-Bond
estimator
(GMM)
HGF in productivity (year-sec) −0.0008 −0.1614∗∗∗ −0.0127∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0013)
HGF in employment (year-sec) −0.0012∗∗∗ −0.0005 0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005)
3-5 years olda −0.0022∗∗∗ −0.0068∗∗∗ −0.0036∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005)
6-10 years old −0.0035∗∗∗ −0.0073∗∗∗ −0.0047∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006)
11-15 years old −0.0039∗∗∗ −0.0061∗∗∗ −0.0040∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0007)
16-20 years old −0.0037∗∗∗ −0.0050∗∗∗ −0.0018∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0008)
21 or more years old −0.0034∗∗∗ −0.0046∗∗∗ −0.0007
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0012)
10-19 employeesb −0.0051∗∗∗ −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.0017∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0006)
20-49 employees −0.0055∗∗∗ −0.0069∗∗∗ −0.0023∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0012)
+50 employees −0.0051∗∗∗ −0.0090∗∗∗ −0.0031
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0020)
Credit approved by new bankc 0.0004∗∗ 0.0003∗ 0.0018∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Not constrained by current bank 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0002∗ 0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
All rejected −0.0001 −0.0010∗∗∗ −0.0007∗
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005)
LT debt ratiod 0.0014∗ 0.0059∗∗∗ 0.0186∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0023)
LT debt ratio2 0.0018∗ 0.0008 −0.0004
(0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0017)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year obs. 2,777,366 2,777,366 2,777,366
Number of firms 623,072 623,072 623,072
Avg. n observations per firm 4.458 4.458
R-squared 0.003 0.035
N of instruments used 201
AR(1) (p-value) −87.309
Prob > z 0.000
AR(2) (p-value) 1.924
Prob > z 0.054
Notes: HGF in productivity are the top 5% of fastest growing firms in labor productivity in the same 2-digit sector on a given
year, conditional on its employment having not decreased in the same period. GMM regressions have been estimated using
twostep robust estimator (Windmeijer, 2005). All estimations contain controls for: firm’s wage premium w.r.t other firms in the
same 2-digit sector (in logs), importer/exporter status, and share of permanent workers.
a The base category are firms with 2 or less years old.
b The reference category are firms with 1 – 9 employees.
c The base category are firms of which we have no credit-related information (that is, either they haven’t made credit requests to
new banks or they are not in the CIR database).
d Expressed on a per unit basis. 60
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Table C.7: Top 1% HGF (equivalent to Table 10)
HGF in employment
(year-sec) (t+1)
HGF in productivity
(year-sec) (t+1)
HGF in employment (year-sec) 0.0339∗∗∗ 0.0338∗∗∗ 0.0004
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0005)
HGF in productivity (year-sec) 0.0029∗∗∗ −0.0127∗∗∗ −0.0127∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0013)
3-5 years olda −0.0016∗∗∗ −0.0015∗∗∗ −0.0037∗∗∗ −0.0037∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)
6-10 years old −0.0037∗∗∗ −0.0036∗∗∗ −0.0049∗∗∗ −0.0049∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
11-15 years old −0.0058∗∗∗ −0.0057∗∗∗ −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.0043∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007)
16-20 years old −0.0074∗∗∗ −0.0073∗∗∗ −0.0023∗∗∗ −0.0023∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008)
21 or more years oldb −0.0108∗∗∗ −0.0107∗∗∗ −0.0014 −0.0014
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0012)
10-19 employees 0.0083∗∗∗ 0.0083∗∗∗ −0.0016∗∗ −0.0016∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0006)
20-49 employees 0.0216∗∗∗ 0.0215∗∗∗ −0.0020∗ −0.0021∗
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0012) (0.0012)
+50 employees 0.0761∗∗∗ 0.0759∗∗∗ −0.0028 −0.0029
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0021) (0.0020)
LT debt ratioc 0.0032 0.0032 0.0210∗∗∗ 0.0211∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0023)
LT debt ratio2 −0.0006 −0.0006 −0.0008 −0.0008
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year obs. 2,777,366 2,777,366 2,777,366 2,777,366
Number of firms 623,072 623,072 623,072 623,072
Avg. n observations per firm 4.458 4.458 4.458 4.458
N of instruments used 161 171 161 171
AR(1) (p-value) −82.131 −82.119 −87.317 −87.315
Prob > z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) (p-value) 0.363 0.354 1.928 1.926
Prob > z 0.717 0.723 0.054 0.054
Notes: HGF in employment are defined as top 10% of firms with the highest “Birch-Schreyer index” in the same 2-digit sector.
HGF in productivity are defined as top 10% of fastest growing firms in labor productivity in the same 2-digit sector on a given
year, conditional on its employment having not decreased in the same period. GMM regressions have been estimated using
twostep robust estimator (Windmeijer, 2005). All estimations contain controls for: firm’s wage premium w.r.t other firms in the
same 2-digit sector (in logs), importer/exporter status, and share of permanent workers.
a The base category are firms with 2 or less years old.
b The reference category are firms with 1 – 9 employees.
c Expressed on a per unit basis.
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Table C.8: Top 5% HGF (equivalent to Table 6)
HGF in employment (year-sec) (t+1) OLS
Within estimator
(FE)
Arellano-Bond
estimator
(GMM)
HGF in employment (year-sec) 0.0804∗∗∗ −0.1036∗∗∗ 0.0362∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0015)
3-5 years olda −0.0050∗∗∗ −0.0127∗∗∗ −0.0107∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0010)
6-10 years old −0.0119∗∗∗ −0.0117∗∗∗ −0.0212∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0012)
11-15 years old −0.0175∗∗∗ −0.0074∗∗∗ −0.0302∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0014)
16-20 years old −0.0212∗∗∗ −0.0031∗ −0.0353∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0018)
21 or more years old −0.0296∗∗∗ −0.0027 −0.0411∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0021) (0.0025)
10-19 employeesb 0.0157∗∗∗ −0.0454∗∗∗ 0.0296∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0025)
20-49 employees 0.0560∗∗∗ −0.1034∗∗∗ 0.0745∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0019) (0.0059)
+50 employees 0.1790∗∗∗ −0.2013∗∗∗ 0.2132∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0047) (0.0167)
Credit approved by a new bankc 0.0199∗∗∗ 0.0096∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008)
Not constrained by current bank 0.0110∗∗∗ 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006)
All rejected 0.0024∗∗∗ −0.0045∗∗∗ −0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0012)
LT debt ratiod 0.0073∗∗∗ −0.0023∗ −0.0028
(0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0045)
LT debt ratio2 −0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0008 −0.0014
(0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0027)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year obs. 2,777,366 2,777,366 2,777,366
Number of firms 623,072 623,072 623,072
Avg. no observations per firm 4.458 4.458
R-squared 0.056 0.036
Number of instruments 191
AB test for autocorrelation of order 1 (z) −189.270
Prob > z 0.000
AB test for autocorrelation of order 2 (z) 1.465
Prob > z 0.143
Notes: HGF in employment are defined as top 5% of firms with the highest “Birch-Schreyer index” in the same 2-digit sector.
GMM regressions have been estimated using twostep robust estimator (Windmeijer, 2005). All estimations contain controls for:
firm’s wage premium w.r.t other firms in the same 2-digit sector (in logs), importer/exporter status, and share of permanent
workers.
a The base category are firms with 2 or less years old.
b The reference category are firms with 1 – 9 employees.
c The base category are firms of which we have no credit-related information (that is, either they haven’t made credit requests to
new banks or they are not in the CIR database).
d Expressed on a per unit basis.
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Table C.9: Top 5% HGF (equivalent to Table 7)
HGF in productivity (year-sec) (t+1) OLS
Within estimator
(FE)
Arellano-Bond
estimator
(GMM)
HGF in productivity (year-sec) 0.0027∗∗∗ −0.1791∗∗∗ −0.0245∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0011)
3-5 years olda −0.0137∗∗∗ −0.0332∗∗∗ −0.0228∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0011)
6-10 years old −0.0216∗∗∗ −0.0392∗∗∗ −0.0347∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0013)
11-15 years old −0.0246∗∗∗ −0.0362∗∗∗ −0.0389∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0016)
16-20 years old −0.0248∗∗∗ −0.0322∗∗∗ −0.0367∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0020)
21 or more years old −0.0233∗∗∗ −0.0290∗∗∗ −0.0344∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0019) (0.0028)
10-19 employeesb −0.0245∗∗∗ −0.0237∗∗∗ −0.0140∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0017)
20-49 employees −0.0263∗∗∗ −0.0379∗∗∗ −0.0212∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0031)
+50 employees −0.0289∗∗∗ −0.0525∗∗∗ −0.0219∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0016) (0.0058)
Credit approved by a new bankc 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Not constrained by current bank 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0090∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006)
All rejected −0.0005 −0.0014∗∗ 0.0006
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0010)
LT debt ratiod 0.0047∗∗ 0.0267∗∗∗ 0.0849∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0069)
LT debt ratio2 0.0059∗ 0.0016 −0.0012
(0.0032) (0.0020) (0.0073)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year obs. 2,777,366 2,777,366 2,777,366
Number of firms 623,072 623,072 623,072
Avg. no observations per firm 4.458 4.458
R-squared 0.012 0.044
Number of instruments 191
AB test for autocorrelation of order 1 (z) −203.673
Prob > z 0.000
AB test for autocorrelation of order 2 (z) 2.363
Prob > z 0.018
Notes: HGF in productivity are the top 5% of fastest growing firms in labor productivity in the same 2-digit sector on a given
year, conditional on its employment having not decreased in the same period. GMM regressions have been estimated using
twostep robust estimator (Windmeijer, 2005). All estimations contain controls for: firm’s wage premium w.r.t other firms in the
same 2-digit sector (in logs), importer/exporter status, and share of permanent workers.
a The base category are firms with 2 or less years old.
b The reference category are firms with 1 – 9 employees.
c The base category are firms of which we have no credit-related information (that is, either they haven’t made credit requests to
new banks or they are not in the CIR database).
d Expressed on a per unit basis.
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Table C.10: Top 5% HGF (equivalent to Table 8)
HGF in employment (year-sec)(t+1) OLS
Within estimator
(FE)
Arellano-Bond
estimator
(GMM)
HGF in employment (year-sec) 0.0804∗∗∗ −0.1036∗∗∗ 0.0360∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0015)
HGF in productivity (year-sec) 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0120∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0009)
3-5 years olda −0.0033∗∗∗ −0.0116∗∗∗ −0.0091∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0010)
6-10 years old −0.0099∗∗∗ −0.0105∗∗∗ −0.0193∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0012)
11-15 years old −0.0155∗∗∗ −0.0063∗∗∗ −0.0283∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0014)
16-20 years old −0.0192∗∗∗ −0.0021 −0.0334∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0018)
21 or more years old −0.0275∗∗∗ −0.0018 −0.0393∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0021) (0.0025)
10-19 employeesb 0.0161∗∗∗ −0.0453∗∗∗ 0.0293∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0025)
20-49 employees 0.0565∗∗∗ −0.1033∗∗∗ 0.0739∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0019) (0.0059)
+50 employees 0.1795∗∗∗ −0.2012∗∗∗ 0.2122∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0047) (0.0167)
Credit approved by a new bankc 0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0096∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008)
Not constrained by current bank 0.0110∗∗∗ 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006)
All rejected 0.0024∗∗∗ −0.0045∗∗∗ −0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0012)
LT debt ratiod 0.0071∗∗∗ −0.0024∗ −0.0029
(0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0045)
LT debt ratio2 −0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0008 −0.0013
(0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0026)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year obs. 2,777,366 2,777,366 2,777,366
Number of firms 623,072 623,072 623,072
Avg. no observations per firm 4.458 4.458
R-squared 0.056 0.036
Number of instruments 201
AB test for autocorrelation of order 1 (z) −189.269
Prob > z 0.000
AB test for autocorrelation of order 2 (z) 1.403
Prob > z 0.161
Notes: HGF in employment are defined as top 5% of firms with the highest “Birch-Schreyer index” in the same 2-digit sector.
GMM regressions have been estimated using twostep robust estimator (Windmeijer, 2005). All estimations contain controls for:
firm’s wage premium w.r.t other firms in the same 2-digit sector (in logs), importer/exporter status, and share of permanent
workers.
a The base category are firms with 2 or less years old.
b The reference category are firms with 1 – 9 employees.
c The base category are firms of which we have no credit-related information (that is, either they haven’t made credit requests to
new banks or they are not in the CIR database).
d Expressed on a per unit basis. 64
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Table C.11: Top 5% HGF (equivalent to Table 9)
HGF in productivity (year-sec) OLS
Within estimator
(FE)
Arellano-Bond
estimator
(GMM)
HGF in productivity (year-sec) 0.0027∗∗∗ −0.1791∗∗∗ −0.0245∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0011)
HGF in employment (year-sec) −0.0035∗∗∗ −0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008)
3-5 years olda −0.0140∗∗∗ −0.0334∗∗∗ −0.0223∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0011)
6-10 years old −0.0219∗∗∗ −0.0394∗∗∗ −0.0340∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0013)
11-15 years old −0.0250∗∗∗ −0.0364∗∗∗ −0.0383∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0016)
16-20 years old −0.0251∗∗∗ −0.0324∗∗∗ −0.0361∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0020)
21 or more years old −0.0237∗∗∗ −0.0292∗∗∗ −0.0339∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0019) (0.0028)
10-19 employeesb −0.0243∗∗∗ −0.0234∗∗∗ −0.0152∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0016)
20-49 employees −0.0259∗∗∗ −0.0371∗∗∗ −0.0242∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0031)
+50 employees −0.0278∗∗∗ −0.0509∗∗∗ −0.0281∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0016) (0.0057)
Credit approved by a new bankc 0.0044∗∗∗ 0.0055∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Not constrained by current bank 0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0089∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006)
All rejected −0.0005 −0.0014∗∗ 0.0006
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0010)
LT debt ratiod 0.0047∗∗ 0.0267∗∗∗ 0.0845∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0070)
LT debt ratio2 0.0059∗ 0.0016 −0.0010
(0.0031) (0.0020) (0.0075)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year obs. 2,777,366 2,777,366 2,777,366
Number of firms 623,072 623,072 623,072
Avg. no observations per firm 4.458 4.458
R-squared 0.013 0.044
Number of instruments 201
AB test for autocorrelation of order 1 (z) −203.668
Prob > z 0.000
AB test for autocorrelation of order 2 (z) 2.332
Prob > z 0.020
Notes: HGF in productivity are the top 5% of fastest growing firms in labor productivity in the same 2-digit sector on a given
year, conditional on its employment having not decreased in the same period. GMM regressions have been estimated using
twostep robust estimator (Windmeijer, 2005). All estimations contain controls for: firm’s wage premium w.r.t other firms in the
same 2-digit sector (in logs), importer/exporter status, and share of permanent workers.
a The base category are firms with 2 or less years old.
b The reference category are firms with 1 – 9 employees.
c The base category are firms of which we have no credit-related information (that is, either they haven’t made credit requests to
new banks or they are not in the CIR database).
d Expressed on a per unit basis. 65
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Table C.12: Top 5% HGF (equivalent to Table 10)
HGF in employment
(year-sec) (t+1)
HGF in productivity
(year-sec) (t+1)
HGF in employment (year-sec) 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0364∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0008)
HGF in productivity (year-sec) 0.0110∗∗∗ −0.0245∗∗∗ −0.0245∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0011)
3-5 years olda −0.0112∗∗∗ −0.0097∗∗∗ −0.0232∗∗∗ −0.0227∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011)
6-10 years old −0.0224∗∗∗ −0.0205∗∗∗ −0.0356∗∗∗ −0.0349∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013)
11-15 years old −0.0323∗∗∗ −0.0304∗∗∗ −0.0405∗∗∗ −0.0398∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0016)
16-20 years old −0.0385∗∗∗ −0.0366∗∗∗ −0.0391∗∗∗ −0.0384∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0020)
21 or more years old −0.0459∗∗∗ −0.0441∗∗∗ −0.0378∗∗∗ −0.0372∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0028)
10-19 employeesb 0.0301∗∗∗ 0.0298∗∗∗ −0.0135∗∗∗ −0.0148∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0017) (0.0016)
20-49 employees 0.0753∗∗∗ 0.0748∗∗∗ −0.0203∗∗∗ −0.0236∗∗∗
(0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0031) (0.0031)
+50 employees 0.2141∗∗∗ 0.2131∗∗∗ −0.0204∗∗∗ −0.0271∗∗∗
(0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0058) (0.0057)
LT debt ratioc 0.0150∗∗ 0.0149∗∗ 0.0988∗∗∗ 0.0983∗∗∗
(0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0059) (0.0060)
LT debt ratio2 −0.0059 −0.0058 −0.0040 −0.0039
(0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0049) (0.0051)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year obs. 2,777,366 2,777,366 2,777,366 2,777,366
Number of firms 623,072 623,072 623,072 623,072
Avg. no observations per firm 4.458 4.458 4.458 4.458
Number of instruments 161 171 161 171
AB test for autocorrelation of order 1 (z) −189.135 −189.134 −203.673 −203.667
Prob > z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AB test for autocorrelation of order 2 (z) 1.495 1.433 2.358 2.325
Prob > z 0.135 0.152 0.018 0.020
Notes: HGF in employment are defined as top 10% of firms with the highest “Birch-Schreyer index” in the same 2-digit sector.
HGF in productivity are defined as top 10% of fastest growing firms in labor productivity in the same 2-digit sector on a given
year, conditional on its employment having not decreased in the same period. GMM regressions have been estimated using
twostep robust estimator (Windmeijer, 2005). All estimations contain controls for: firm’s wage premium w.r.t other firms in the
same 2-digit sector (in logs), importer/exporter status, and share of permanent workers.
a The base category are firms with 2 or less years old.
b The reference category are firms with 1 – 9 employees.
c Expressed on a per unit basis.
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